Economic Adjustment and Exchange Rates in Developing Countries by Arnold Harberger
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Economic Adjustment and Exchange Rates in Developing Countries
Volume Author/Editor: Sebastian Edwards and Liaquat Ahamed, eds.




Chapter Title: Economic Adjustment and the Real Exchange Rate
Chapter Author: Arnold Harberger
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7679
Chapter pages in book: (p. 369 - 424)Economic Adjustment and  IV  the Real Exchange Rate This Page Intentionally Left Blank11  Economic Adjustment and 
the Real Exchange Rate 
Arnold C.  Harberger 
11.1  Introduction and Summary 
At the time of this writing (July  1985) it is hardly necessary to try 
to motivate a study seeking to clarify the concept of the real exchange 
rate and to improve our understanding  of the reasons for its movements. 
Among the major currencies, the Deutschmark has moved from a high 
of around .55 U.S. dollars in 1979 to a low of around $.30 in 1984-85. 
Over roughly the same period the British pound has fluctuated from 
more than two dollars down to barely over one. These movements far 
exceed the differential  rates of inflation of  the countries concerned. 
Real rates in both cases have exhibited swings spanning a factor of 1.5 
or more. 
Even though those variations in the dollar/Deutschmark and the dollar/ 
pound exchange rates were greeted with widespread surprise and com- 
ment, they look minor when compared with the movements experi- 
enced by many less developed  countries. For these countries, even 
after double deflation to correct for movements in their general price 
levels and in that of the United States, the observed range of variation 
of real exchange rates is nothing short of dramatic. For example, Mex- 
ico’s real exchange rate vis-&-vis  the U.S. dollar increased by around 
80 percent between the fourth quarter of 1981 and the third quarter of 
1982; Brazil’s took a similar swing between the first quarter of  1982 
and the third quarter of 1984; Uruguay’s about doubled from the third 
quarter of 1982 to the first quarter of 1984; Chile’s did the same from 
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the first quarter of  1982 to the first quarter of  1985. And  Argentina 
broke recent records with a more than quadrupling of its real exchange 
rate from the first quarter of  1981 to the third quarter of  1982. Even 
after substantial adjustment Argentina’s real rate remained (at the end 
of  1983 and the beginning of  1984) at around three times its level of 
three years earlier. 
The exploration of issues regarding the real exchange rate has surely 
been made more vital and pressing by this recent history, but at the 
same time it has been made more difficult to expound because of the 
enrichment our theoretical arsenal has  experienced in  the past few 
decades. Whereas the so-called elasticities approach was once king, 
its hegemony has more  recently been challenged by  the absorption 
(income-expenditures approach) and by the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments. And whereas a supply-demand framework based 
on flows once ruled supreme, more modern analyses deal with stocks 
as well as flows. In addition, they treat phenomena such as substitution 
between and among currencies that were not contemplated in the earlier 
traditions of  international economics. Thus, although real exchange 
rate analysis may appear quite straightforward and natural in terms of 
the earlier traditions, it seems less self-evident to those who have worked 
predominantly within the spheres defined by more recent research cur- 
rents and trends. 
11.1.1 
To begin, then, I shall try to place the phenomenon of real exchange 
rates, and the approach to be followed in this paper, in a setting that 
reveals its full compatibility with both the older and the newer strands 
of economic thinking.  A convenient springboard is provided by the 
following “generalized”  demand equation: 
A Model of Real Exchange Rates 
(I)  Qf  = Uo f ali(pj/pd) f U2i y  + LZ~;  aO f U,;(M“ -  Md). 
[elasticities  [absorption  [monetary 
approach]  approach]  approach] 
Here Qf  is the quantity of the ith good demanded; (Pi/pd)  is its relative 
price (in relation to a general price index Pd  faced by local demanders); 
y  is a measure of the real income of the demanders; AD  is the net 
increment (measured in the same metric as y)  to their borrowings from 
abroad; Ms  is the actual money supply in their possession; and Md is 
the amount they would demand in a full comparative static equilibrium 
if  all key determining variables were to remain at their present levels. 
The exposition presented in this paper is in terms of the flow supply 
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i is equal to the excess of the demand for purchases of good i (Q$  in 
the above equation) over the domestic supply of (Q;)  of the same. Since 
Q: can also be expressed as a function of the relative price pilpd,  we 
can, for given levels of  y,  AD,  and (M” -  Md), together with other 
variables  influencing  Qf, determine  the  demand  for  imports  of  i 
(Qf - Qf)  as a function of pilpd.  In a similar way, the supply of exports 
of good j (Qj - Qj” can be derived as a function of PjlPd.  The demand 
functions for individual import goods then provide the basis for the 
(flow) demand curve for foreign currency; likewise, the (flow) supply 
curve of foreign currency is built up from the supply functions for the 
individual export items. The equilibrium exchange rate (in the absence 
of  capital movements)  is the price  that  equilibrates the  supply and 
demand for foreign currency thus derived, with appropriate adjustment 
for capital movements. 
In the framework described by equation (l),  the absorption approach 
is represented in part by the term a&D.  This term reflects how ad- 
ditional indebtedness contracted abroad will influence the demand for 
good i; it is kept separate from the income term because the coefficients 
and a3i  are likely to be different from each other. When foreign 
borrowing occurs, it is often for a quite specific purpose (such as an 
investment project) with its own requirements for goods and services. 
The pattern of these requirements (reflected in asi)  will only by accident 
be similar to the pattern (reflected in a2J in which incremental income 
is typically spent. 
In part,  too, the absorption approach  is reflected  in  the term a4i 
(M” - Md). If “excessive” domestic credit creation occurs, not backed 
by  loans  from  abroad, it  will  lead  to “excessive”  (in the sense of 
additional) demand for goods and services. In the process  “excess” 
money balances will be created, which over some span of time will be 
worked off. To  the extent, then, that the excess of expenditures over 
income, dealt with in the absorption approach, is a disequilibrium phe- 
nomenon financed by domestic credit expansion, it appears in the fourth 
term of equation (1). 
(M” - Md) also captures essential elements of the mon- 
etary approach to the balance of payments and of the idea of currency 
substitution. When the central bank engages in creating money (for 
simplicity, say, under a fixed exchange rate regime), the excess of the 
new money supply over the amount desired by economic agents will 
tend to be spent. Over time, this excess will tend to be reflected in a 
loss of reserves, which in turn will normally have the effect of inducing 
the monetary authorities to put on the brakes.  If  they do not, a de- 
valuation crisis may be in the making. 
Summing the demand functions for imports (derived as indicated 
above) over all the relevant goods and services yields the main com- 
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ponent of the flow demand (Fd)  for foreign currency. Doing the same 
for export goods and services yields the main component of the cor- 
responding flow supply (F").  Thus, we may write: 
(2a)  Fd = bo + 2 u,~(P~/~~)  + bfi + b3AD 
I 
+ b4(W -  Md) + . . . 
[the demand for foreign currency arising from imports] 
(2b)  Fs = CO - 2 a,(P,lPd) - ~9 - c~AD  - c~(W  - Md) + . . . 
.i 
[the supply of foreign currency arising from exports]. 
Here b2 would be equal to Xi uZi,  b, to Xi  and b4 to Zi u4i, where 
the summation runs over the set i of import goods and services; c2,  c,, 
and c4 would have similar connections to the uZi,  and u4i, the sum- 
mation here being over the set of goods and servicesj that end up as 
exports. 
Equations (2a) and (2b) do not tell the complete story of  the flow 
demand for and supply of foreign currency. We  must recognize that 
the net new indebtedness of a country (AD)  is itself a component of 
the supply of  available funds. Thus, when the net increment to debt 
within a period is fully spent on tradable goods, the increment of debt 
by itself causes the flow supply of foreign exchange to increase by AD. 
But  the  spending of  the borrowed funds causes  the flow  supply to 
contract by c,AD (because of increased spending on exportables), while 
the increased  spending on importables causes the flow demand for 
foreign exchange to expand by b@.  Thus, if b3 + c, = 1, as it must 
if  the new indebtedness is indeed fully spent on tradables, there is no 
cause for the equilibrium price of foreign currency to change. The added 
demand for foreign exchange associated with spending the borrowed 
funds is just matched by the added supply (as represented by the new 
debt itself). 
In this context AD  should be defined broadly.  An  increment in  a 
country's dollar indebtedness, if  used to acquire Miami real estate or 
equities on the New York Stock Exchange, would entail a zero AD. 
The same increment to dollar debt, used for the purchases of imports 
or of goods and services in the country's domestic market, would entail 
a positive  AD, whereas the straight purchase of assets in Miami or 
New York (without borrowing the dollars) would generate a negative 
AD.  In  short, we  want AD  to reflect net foreign investment in  the 
standard national accounting sense. 
One possible  cause of  a negative  AD (in this sense) is a wave of 
currency substitution. Rather than acquiring capital assets located within 
the United States, a country's residents might simply buy dollar bills 375  Economic Adjustment and the Real Exchange Rate 
to hold as a store of value or as a medium of  exchange. Such an act 
would be treated, for the purposes of the present analysis, as if it were 
a capital movement from the country in question to the United States 
(that is, a negative AD). If  this movement were fully matched by in- 
creases in the supply of exports or reductions in import demand (that 
is, if  for this particular  “capital  movement”  b3 + c3 were equal to 
one), the whole operation would entail no pressure on the exchange 
rate. But if the increment in demand for foreign currency came at the 
expense of  nontradables or simply as a shift of money holdings from 
local currency to U.S. dollars, the negative hD  would not be offset 
and the country’s currency would experience a tendency to depreciation. 
In the framework of this paper, the exchange rate is the variable that 
equilibrates the flow demand for and the flow supply of  foreign ex- 
change, that is, that brings about: 
(3)  Fd = Fs + AD. 
In terms of its time dimension or assumed degree of adjustment, one 
can probably say that the analysis concentrates on the middle to long 
run rather than on an extremely short one.  Changes in  a country’s 
commercial policy, reasonably lasting shifts in the size or direction of 
capital flows, or both, and changes in the relative prices of particular 
products in world markets-these  are the types of disturbances that 
will be analyzed here. 
In conducting the analysis, the focus will accordingly be on those 
variables that bring about a new “equilibrium”  of the economy under 
the changed circumstances. I therefore will pass over such elements 
as currency  substitution,  speculative waves,  transitory  disequilibria 
between Md  and Ms,  and undesired changes in the levels of a country’s 
international reserves. But this does not at all mean that the analysis 
presented here is somehow incompatible with these elements. They 
are left to one side only because I concentrate on the comparison of 
one equilibrium and another, in each of which the flow supply of and 
demand for foreign exchange come from exports and imports of goods 
and services that can be expected to be maintained at a relatively steady 
pace for some time, and the difference between flow supply and flow 
demand is compensated by voluntary capital movements that (within 
either the beginning or the ending equilibrium) likewise are not expected 
to be dramatically altered in the near term. 
11.1.2  An Overview of the Analysis 
The purpose of  this paper is to take the reader on something of a 
guided tour of exchange rate analysis. Starting from the most elemen- 
tary building blocks of international trade theory, I will deal first, in 
section 11.2,  with the determination of the nominal exchange rate under 376  Arnold C. Harberger 
idealized circumstances: a flexible exchange rate system supported by 
a monetary policy that keeps the general level of prices stable. I will 
then move on to an equally familiar set of problems: examining the 
international adjustment mechanism for a small country with a fixed 
exchange rate. In each of these cases we shall examine the economic 
adjustments  required  by  six  different types of  disturbances:  (a) the 
imposition of import restrictions; (b) the imposition of  export restric- 
tions; (c) an inflow of capital spent exclusively on tradable goods; (d) an 
inflow of capital spent exclusively on nontradable goods; (e) a rise in 
the world price of an export product; and (f) a rise in the world price 
of an import product. 
I will show that the equilibrium nominal exchange rate (the domestic 
currency price of foreign money) falls as a result  of  (a), rises as a 
consequence of (b), remains unchanged under (c), and falls under (d) 
and (e). The adjustment to disturbances of type (f) is ambiguous; its 
direction depends critically on the elasticity of the demand for imports 
of the affected product(s). 
Our first meeting with the concept of  the real exchange rate will 
come in section 11.3. When the nominal exchange rate is held constant, 
the same adjustments dealt with in section  11.2 take place through 
movements of  the general price level.  Whereas under a flexible ex- 
change rate (with stable monetary policy) the disturbances (a) through 
(f) result  in  movements in  the nominal exchange rate, E, the same 
disturbances give rise to movements in the general price level, pd,  when 
a fixed exchange rate policy is pursued. When the exchange rate vari- 
able to be studied is defined as (E/pd),  the identical analysis is capable 
of answering the problems posed in both sections 11.2 and 11.3. 
Section  11.4 explores in some detail the concept of the  “dollar’s 
worth”  as the unit of  measurement of the quantities of imports and 
exports. This concept implies that the exchange rate depends on the 
world prices of tradable goods in a fashion analogous to the way in 
which it depends on import and export restrictions, and on capital flows 
spent on tradable and nontradable goods. In particular, the exchange 
rate depends on the world prices of a country’s export goods in one 
way, and on the world prices of that country’s import goods in another, 
quite different way. 
This concept argues powerfully against thinking of the real exchange 
rate as the price index of tradable goods relative to that of nontradables. 
In the simple analysis of  sections 11.2 and  11.3 the nominal exchange 
rate is always the peso price of the dollar. The real exchange rate in 
these simple exercises is the peso price of the dollar relative  to the 
general price index (or some other chosen numeraire). 
Section  11.5 addresses the problem of  following a country’s real 
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try to replicate insofar as possible the analysis of sections  11.2 and 
11.3. The problem is one of dealing with changes in  the value of the 
dollar (or other relevant foreign currency unit) over time.  We  know 
that for simple cases like those in sections 11.2 and 11.3 we want to 
measure imports and exports in units of the “dollar’s worth”; we also 
know that  the  number  (quantity) of  such units  should  change with 
alterations in the dollar prices of  one or more import or export goods. 
But these conclusions were reached by doing exercises that were “time- 
less” in the sense that all comparative static theory is timeless. When 
we postulate changes in the dollar prices of some imports and exports, 
we are implicitly holding other dollar prices constant. This assumption 
is not made when we follow a real-world economy over time. In addition 
to the movements  of  the dollar prices of  each particular country’s 
tradables, there is a general movement of  world prices, measured in 
terms of  dollars or any other relevant foreign currency. We would like 
to be able to correct for general world price movements when we work 
with data spanning extended periods of time, yet at the same time we 
want to allow for changes in the relative prices of  some or all of  a 
country’s imports and of some or all of its exports. 
This last objective is accomplished by the choice of  some general 
dollar (or world) price level, p*, as the yardstick for measuring over 
time the “real dollar’s worth.”  Thus, the nominal demand for foreign 
exchange arising out of imports is Mpk, where M is the quantity and 
pk the dollar price of imports; the nominal supply of foreign exchange 
arising out of  exports is Xp:, with X  being the quantity and p: dollar 
price. The real quantity of foreign exchange demanded (for imports) 
is then measured over time t by M,pkJp;,  and the real quantity supplied 
(for exports) by X@:Jp;. The corresponding real price of foreign ex- 
change is EfpT/pdr,  where p; is the general dollar price index and pdr is 
the general price index of the country in question, all at time t. The 
product of  the real price times multiplied by  the quantity would be, 
for  imports,  (M,pk,/&)  (Efp;lpdr)  =  MtpkfE/pdf,  and  for  exports, 
(xfP:f/p;)(E&;lpdf) = XrP:fE/pdr. That is, the real price times the real 
quantity of foreign exchange in either category is equal to its nominal 
domestic currency value at the border divided by the general index of 
domestic prices. This is as it should be. The real value of the foreign 
exchange demanded or supplied, as distinct from its real quantity or 
its real price, is independent of the index chosen to correct for changes 
in world prices over time. It depends, as it should, only on the current 
nominal market values of the foreign exchange transacted, and on the 
current value of  the domestic price index used  to convert  nominal 
domestic currency values into real values. 
In  section  11.6 I discuss the issues surrounding the choice of  an 
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established  that  the real  exchange rate  should fall  when  the dollar 
prices  of  exportables rise and should also be influenced by  changes 
in the dollar prices of importables, I rule out the use of these specific 
prices, separately or in combination (that is, the dollar price level of 
the country’s tradables), as the relevant deflating index. Ruling out a 
country-specific  deflating index  automatically  suggests that a single 
dollar-price index be used for determining the real volume of foreign 
currency  demand  and  supply and  for defining the basket  of  goods 
whose relative price in each country is that country’s real exchange 
rate. The questions that arise in this context are (a) whether the index 
should refer to dollar prices or to prices expressed in other currencies 
as well and (b) whether the index should reflect mainly or wholly the 
prices of tradables (even though it is not separately calculated for each 
country’s tradables) or instead attempt to achieve a broader coverage 
of goods and services. 
The answers given to these questions are admittedly judgmental rather 
than deterministic, suggesting useful and convenient conventions rather 
than solutions that are dictated in some absolute sense by the under- 
lying theory. The answer suggested for (a) is that so long as the relevant 
trade  statistics are presented  in  terms of  U.S.  dollars, the deflating 
index should be a deflator of dollar prices, but this does not prevent it 
from being an average of  U.S. prices along with German prices con- 
verted at the dollar price of the Deutschmark, British prices converted 
at the dollar price of the pound, Japanese prices converted at the dollar 
price of the yen, and so on. 
With respect to question (b), the concept is suggested of a basket of 
tradable goods  somewhere on the high seas. The grounds for using 
wholesale price indexes are that they are composed predominantly of 
tradables and that they are available on a monthly basis and in general 
quite promptly. Simplest would be the use of the U.S. wholesale price 
index to deflate dollar values of imports and exports and to define over 
time the “real dollar” for which the real exchange rate of any country’s 
currency is the relative price. More complicated but probably prefer- 
able would be a weighted average of the dollar prices of the wholesale 
price baskets of the major trading nations. 
The notion that what is being priced is a bundle of tradables floating 
on the ocean rules  out consumer price baskets  and gross domestic 
(national)  product  (GDP)  baskets.  But  one  could  conceive  of  a 
weighted  average  of  the tradable components  of  these baskets.  To 
the extent that separable GDP price deflators are already calculated 
for  the  manufacturing  and  the  agricultural  sectors,  the  possibility 
exists of  building national price indexes for tradables on the basis of 
these components. 379  Economic Adjustment and the Real Exchange Rate 
11.2  The Equilibrium Exchange Rate Under a Flexible Rate System 
The six types of disturbances listed in the previous section are here 
analyzed for a flexible exchange rate  system, under the assumption 
that monetary policy is managed in such a way as to keep constant the 
general price level (pd)  of the country in question. Unless otherwise 
specified, prices in  the rest  of  the world (expressed in  the relevant 
foreign currency units-in  this case dollars) are also assumed to be 
constant. Thus, the movements in the nominal exchange rate as derived 
in this section will also be movements in  the real exchange rate as 
defined in the preceding section. 
The demand curves for imports and the supply curves for exports 
presented in figure 11.1 are calibrated so that the quantity axis refers 
to units that cost one dollar at world market prices. Thus, if the world 
price of coal is 50 dollars a ton (2,000 pounds), coal will be measured 
in units of 40 (= 2000/50) pounds. If aluminum has a world price of 80 
cents a pound, it will be measured in units of  1.25 pounds. In this way 
the foreign currency demand curves created by many different import 
goods  can be amalgamated with  a  single demand  curve for foreign 
currency to pay for imports; and the foreign currency supply curves 
created by many different export commodities can be aggregated into 
a single foreign currency supply curve created by  exports. The two 
aggregate curves thus constructed are the demand curve for imports 
and the supply curve for exports, as these terms are commonly used 
in the literature of international economics. 
When tariffs on imports exist, the demand for foreign currency cre- 
ated by any import good is derived by taking the demand price net of 
tariff for each successive dollar’s worth of the import. This is done in 
figure  1l.la for the case of  a general tariff (T,)  on all imports. The 
tariff is assumed to be a fixed percentage of the local currency price 
of the product; this assumption generates a net-of-tariff demand curve 
that spins out from the same quantity-axis intercept as the gross-of- 
tariff curve. One can easily see how the equilibrium exchange rate is 
reduced by the imposition of the tariff  both imports and exports fall 
(balanced trade is assumed here unless otherwise specified). 
In figure 11  .lb the case of a uniform export tax is examined. In this 
case the equilibrium market exchange rate must be sufficient to pay 
both the fundamental supply price of exports (given by the height, at 
any quantity, of the solid supply curve of exports) and the tax that is 
taken by the government. When there is no tax the equilibrium is at 
M,, = X,, and the market exchange rate E,, goes only to pay the sup- 
pliers of exports; when there is a tax the equilibrium shifts to MI = X,, 
where the market exchange rate produces enough to pay both what a) IMPORT TARIFF (T,)  IS  IMPOSED  b) EXPORT  TAX (T,)  IS IMPOSED 
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Fig. 11.1  Adjustment to disturbances under a flexible rate system. (The 
general price level Pd is held constant by monetary policy 
and imports (M)  and exports (X)  are measured in units worth 
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the suppliers of  exports require to provide the quantity XI  and what 
the government demands in the form of export taxes. 
A comparison of figures 11. la  and 11. lb  confirms the familiar prop- 
osition that under conditions of balanced trade the identical equilibrium 
can be produced either by a uniform import tariff (la) or a uniform 
export tax (lb). It is worth nothing that although such an equilibrium 
is identical in terms of the quantities of exports and imports (at MI = X,), 
and in terms of the gross price paid by the demanders of imports and 
the net price received by the suppliers of exports, it is not identical 
with respect to the exchange rate. In the specific case examined here, 
the nominal exchange rate falls as the result  of an import tariff and 
rises as a consequence of an (otherwise equivalent) export tax. More 
generally, we will find that the equilibrium real exchange rate likewise 
has opposite directions of movement in response to import tariffs, on 
the one hand, and export taxes, on the other. 
Figures 11. lc  and 11. Id trace the consequences of inflows of capital. 
The first case is that in which the proceeds of the borrowing are spent 
on imports. This means that the demand curve for imports shifts to the 
right by  the amount of the borrowing.  Since the equilibrium of  the 
balance  of  payments will  require imports to exceed exports by  the 
amount of foreign borrowing, there is no cause for the exchange rate 
to change in this case. It would be the same if  the proceeds of the 
borrowing were spent fully on exportables (in which case the supply 
curve of exports would shift to the left by the amount of the borrowing, 
while the demand curve for imports would stay put) or if these proceeds 
were divided, with one part being spent on exportables and the re- 
mainder on importables. In the latter case the supply curve of exports 
would shift to the left by the amount of borrowing spent on exportables, 
and the demand curve for imports would shift to the right by the amount 
of the borrowing spent on importables. The combination of these two 
shifts would create, at the old exchange rate E,, an excess of import 
demand over export supply equal to exactly the amount of the bor- 
rowing. Hence, when foreign borrowings are spent on tradables, they 
do not affect the equilibrium exchange rate. 
The story is different when foreign borrowings are spent on non- 
tradables. Here an economic adjustment must be made (the so-called 
transfer problem must be solved) in order to validate in real terms what 
would otherwise be simply a transfer of  monetary purchasing power. 
The receiving country effectively uses a net capital inflow only to the 
extent that it imports more than it exports. When the capital flow is 
directly spent on tradables, the required excess of imports over exports 
is automatically created (see above). But when the capital flow is spent 
on nontradable goods and services (such as for roads, housing con- 
struction, and irrigation projects), the money borrowed from abroad 382  Arnold C. Harberger 
(dollars) must be sold to obtain the domestic currency (pesos) needed 
to pay  wages  and  cover other domestic costs.  In  the process,  the 
exchange rate will fall, as depicted in figure 1  l.ld, so long as monetary 
stability is maintained. 
Of  course, any actual capital inflow from abroad is unlikely to be 
spent exclusively on either tradables or  nontradables. It should be clear 
from figures 11. lc  and 1  1. Id that in such a case the exchange rate will 
still fall, since the part of  the capital flow spent on tradables has no 
effect while the part spent on nontradables introduces downward pres- 
sure on the rate. 
Figure  1l.le depicts the by  now familiar phenomenon of  “Dutch 
disease.” A substantial increase in the world prices of exports-in  real- 
world cases, a rise in the price of an important export product (natural 
gas, for example, in the case of Holland)-generates  a large increase 
in the amount of foreign currency available in the market, which in 
turn leads to a reduction in  the exchange rate  (the price  of foreign 
currency). The rise in the world price of exports causes a shift in the 
supply curve of foreign currency, even though the supply curve of the 
export good in terms of its own peso price remains constant. A single 
point on the peso supply curve, showing 20 million pounds of sugar at 
a price of one peso per pound, will be reflected in a supply of foreign 
currency of two million dollars against an exchange rate of  10 pesos 
per dollar if  the world price is ten cents a pound; a supply of foreign 
currency of four million dollars against an exchange rate of five pesos 
per dollar if the world price is 20 cents a pound; and a supply of foreign 
currency of one million dollars against an exchange rate of 20  pesos 
per dollar if the world price is five cents a pound. Thus, an unchanged 
supply curve of  sugar in terms of its domestic relative price will be 
translated into different supply curves of foreign exchange,2  depending 
on the dollar price of sugar in the world market. Accordingly, as shown 
in figure 11. le, the market exchange rate will fall (from Eo to El)  under 
a flexible rate regime in conditions of  monetary stability. 
Figure 11.  If shows that the foreign exchange demand curve created 
by imports also undergoes a shift with a changing world market price 
of  the import  goods  in  question.  Though  the nature  of  the shift  is 
identical to that applying to the supply curve of exports, the shift in 
figure 11.  If looks different from that in figure 11. le. This is only because 
the demand curve for imports slopes downward, while the supply curve 
of exports slopes up. The nature of the economic adjustment to a rise 
in the world price of imports is clear. The initial response is simply a 
rise in the internal (peso) price of the good(s) in question. This response 
will be  reflected in unchanged  peso expenditures if  the elasticity  of 
demand for imports of the good is one; in increased peso expenditures 
if  the elasticity  is less than one; and in reduced peso outlays if  the 
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this we can deduce that there will be a range in which the demand for 
dollars (at a given exchange rate) will be reduced and another range in 
which that demand will be increased as a consequence of a rise in the 
world price of imports. In the case depicted, the initial equilibrium (at 
exchange rate Eo)  was in the range in which the demand for imports 
had an elasticity greater than one; hence, the consequence of the price 
rise is  a reduction in total peso  outlays on  dollars.  Had  the initial 
equilibrium been in a different range, peso outlays might have gone up 
rather than down, in which case the equilibrium exchange rate would 
have risen rather than fallen.3 
11.3  Economic Adjustment Under Fixed Exchange Rates 
Figure 11.2 shows how the adjustment process works under a fixed 
exchange rate system. The key element that distinguishes this system 
from that of the flexible rate is that now the money supply and the 
general price level, pd, play an active role. Figure 11.2a considers the 
imposition of a 50 percent uniform import tariff. Since the world prices 
of importables and exportables are given, the tariff will cause the price 
of  imports to rise, while that of  exports (at the fixed exchange rate) 
stays constant. The reduction in imports resulting from the price in- 
crease causes a surplus to emerge in the balance of trade (which initially 
was in equilibrium). This, in  turn, leads to expansion of the money 
supply as the central bank buys the extra dollars. As the money supply 
expands, upward pressure is placed on the general level of prices and 
costs, pd. Since the demand for imports and the supply of exports are 
functions of the relative prices (pm/pd and p,/pd, respectively) of imports 
and exports, the upward pressure on pd causes these curves to shift 
upward. 
The new equilibrium consistent with a 50 percent uniform tariff is 
shown at MI  = XI  in  figure 11.2a. The price  paid by demanders of 
imports is 15 pesos per dollar's worth. Of  this, five pesos goes to the 
government, and ten pesos goes to buy the necessary foreign exchange 
at the fixed rate of ten pesos per dollar. The amount of foreign exchange 
demanded is M,;  this is equal to XI,  the amount supplied. The supply 
of foreign exchange has been reduced in the adjustment process as the 
pressure of increasing costs shifted the supply curve upward from S! 
to s:. 
Figure 11.2b shows how the adjustment process works when a uni- 
form export tax of 33 9'3  percent is imposed. In this case the effect is 
to reduce the supply of exports relative to the demand for imports. A 
deficit in the balance of  trade emerges, which has as its consequence 
a loss of  international reserves and a reduction in the money supply. 
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costs. Equilibrium is reached in a situation like that represented by the 
broken-line curves fim  and gX.  The quantity of  imports demanded (at 
a price equal to ten pesos per dollar’s worth) has fallen from Mo to MI 
because the general price level (pd) has fallen while import prices re- 
mained the same. The quantity of  exports has fallen because in the 
presence of the tax, exporters are receiving only 6.67 pesos per dollar’s 
worth. Costs have fallen, and this has caused a shift of the supply curve 
of exports from S!  to gx,  but the incentives are still for a reduction in 
supply from the initial equilibrium at Mo = Xo. This is because the 
prices received by exporters have fallen more than the general price 
level, causing a movement back along 3, from Xo  to XI. 
This is the appropriate time to compare the results of figures 11.2a 
and 11.2b with those of  1l.la and 1l.lb. The new equilibrium in the 
latter two cases can be replicated in figure 11.2 by following the solid 
curves 0%  and S!  to the new equilibrium. If  the general price level 
remains constant while the exchange rate falls, the equilibrium in figure 
11.2a would be at an exchange rate of eight pesos per dollar; buyers 
of imports would pay  12 pesos per dollar’s worth, because of  the 50 
percent import tariff. 
The  adjustment mechanism  under fixed  exchange rates produces 
(figure 11.2a) an equilibrium in  which demanders pay  15 pesos  per 
dollar’s worth of imports, and suppliers receive ten pesos per dollar’s 
worth of exports when the exchange rate is ten pesos per dollar and a 
50 percent import tariff is in effect. With the same exchange rate, a 
33 V3 percent export tax would generate (figure 11.2b) an equilibrium 
in which demanders would pay ten pesos, and suppliers would receive 
6.67 pesos per dollar’s worth. But in real terms all of these equilibria 
are the same. In all of them the price paid by demanders for a dollar’s 
worth of imports ends up 50 percent higher than the price received by 
suppliers for a dollar’s worth of exports. The differences in the levels 
of import and export prices simply mirror what happens to the general 
price level in each of the three cases. In the flexible exchange rate case 
(solid-line curves) the general price level, pd, remains constant. In the 
fixed exchange rate case with a 50 percent import tariff the monetary 
expansion produced by the adjustment causes the general price level 
to move up from index 100 to index 125. Under a 33  V3 percent export 
tax, the deflationary process  entailed  by  the adjustment causes the 
general price level to fall from index 100 to index 83 Y3.  Thus, in each 
of the final equilibria the price of imports has risen 20 percent and the 
price of exports has fallen 20 percent, relative to the general price level. 
Figure 11.2d is comparable to figure 11. Id. A capital inflow equal in 
amount to (M, - XI)  dollars and spent wholly on nontradables would, 
if the general price level pd  were held stable by monetary policy, cause 
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dollar. This is  shown by  the gap  (M, -  X,) between  the  solid-line 
curves DL and  S,O.  Obviously, this cannot  happen  if  the country  is 
maintaining a fixed exchange rate. In such a case the initial impact of 
the capital inflow will come through the sale of the borrowed foreign 
exchange (dollars) to the central bank  so as to obtain the domestic 
currency (pesos) needed for buying nontradable goods and services in 
the domestic market. This causes an expansion of  the  peso money 
supply-an  expansion that continues until the gap between imports and 
exports becomes equal to the size of the capital inflow (here assumed 
to be a continuing flow over time, not a one-shot injection of funds). 
In the case depicted in figure 11.2d equilibrium is reached when the 
monetary expansion has caused a 40 percent upward shift in the demand 
curve for imports and in the supply curve for exports. This is consonant 
with a rise of 40 percent in the general price level, pd. Comparability 
between the fixed rate and the flexible rate cases is maintained. In the 
fixed rate case the general price level rises from 100 to 140, while the 
exchange rate stays constant at ten pesos per dollar. In the flexible rate 
case the general price level is assumed to remain constant; under that 
assumption  the  equilibrium  exchange  rate  must  fall  to  10  x  (1/ 
1.4) = 7.14, shown on the graph as approximately equal to seven. 
Figure  11.2e shows the response of  the economy to a rise in  the 
world price of exports when a fixed exchange rate is assumed. The rise 
in  price itself shifts the supply curve of foreign currency to the right 
(as also occurred in figure 11. le, and as is explained in greater detail 
in  the discussion  of  figure  11.3b below). This would,  with a flexible 
exchange rate and a stable general price level pd, cause the nominal 
exchange rate to fall from ten to six pesos per dollar. Instead, with a 
fixed exchange rate of ten pesos, monetary expansion occurs as a result 
of the inflow of foreign exchange, driving up the general level of prices 
pd. Its new equilibrium level is 166 Y3  rather than 100. The new equi- 
librium real exchange rate, E/pd,  is therefore the same under a fixed 
exchange rate system as it would be under a flexible one. 
11.4  The Concept of the “Dollar’s Worth” 
It is hardly a new idea that when dealing with problems of interna- 
tional trade for a small country, one should treat world prices as given 
and should use the concept of composite commodities based on the 
given world prices when working with aggregates such as the demand 
for tradables, the supply of tradables, the demand for imports, and the 
supply of exports. Indeed, far from being new, the idea has become 
commonplace to the point that a shorthand notation has been developed 
for it. When a writer wants to key his readers into this well-established 
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lowing analysis will be based on a small-country hypothesis” and then 
proceeds to his task. 
It is my contention that we have probably become too complacent, 
too cavalier in working with the small-country hypothesis. Under its 
convenient shorthand, I believe, we have in effect buried at least two 
important  issues.  First, by  correctly  assuming that nothing a small 
country can do will change the world prices it faces, we have somehow 
fallen into the trap of  neglecting changes in the world prices of indi- 
vidual commodities as an important class of  disturbances to be ana- 
lyzed. Second, and in part as a consequence of the first, we have been 
far too uncritical in accepting as a definition of the real exchange rate 
the ratio of the “price of  tradables”  to the “price of nontradables.” 
On the first point, let us recognize that one uses the small-country 
hypothesis in building the demand curve for imports, the supply curve 
for exports, and their counterparts for importables, exportables, and 
tradables generally. Each of  these is typically a composite good; in 
constructing the demand or supply curve of that composite, we assume 
the individual prices  of  its  separate  component items move up and 
down together, that is, in the same proportion. Many of the problems 
that are dealt with in this context, particularly at the textbook or the 
very general analytical level, can be handled using composite goods 
thus defined. 
Let the relative price of  each member of the composite be defined 
as p;E(Z  + $)/pd,  where p;  is the world price; E, the nominal exchange 
rate translating the world price from dollars into pesos; and  tj, the 
distortion (tariff in the case of imports, export subsidy in the case of 
exports) causing the internal price to be above the world price con- 
verted at the market exchange rate. The relative price of all tradables, 
thus defined, will move up and down if  the exchange rate moves up 
and down, as would naturally happen, other things equal, with a change 
in the rate of capital inflow under a flexible exchange rate system. The 
relative price of all tradables would react similarly to capital flows under 
a fixed exchange rate system, but in this case the common fluctuations 
in each relative price derive from changes in pd rather than in E. 
In dealing with uniform tariffs-standard  fare for textbook treatments 
of this type of material-one must distinguish between importables and 
exportables. But once that distinction is made one can see how, under 
the small-country hypothesis, a uniform tariff will cause the relative 
prices of  all importables to move up by an equal amount, and those of 
all exportables to move down by a given amount. An export tax has a 
similar effect. A uniform export subsidy works on the relative prices 
of all exportables in the same way as a uniform import tariff works on 
the relative prices of all importables. 
From the above we can derive such familiar results as the equivalence 
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uniform import duties, on the other, and the fact that (again under 
balanced trade) a uniform import tariff combined with a uniform export 
subsidy at the same rate has no ultimate real effect at all, producing 
instead only a countervailing movement, from one equilibrium to an- 
other, in the ratio E/pd. 
The same framework has also been widely used  in discussions of 
purchasing power parity. It shows, for example, how, when allpj*  terms 
(for imports and exports alike) change by a given percentage, equilib- 
rium can be restored under a fixed exchange rate by an equal percentage 
movement  in  pd. More generally,  the necessary  adjustment  can  be 
achieved through an offsetting movement in the ratio E/pd.  When the 
predominant forces at work are monetary ones and they cause all the 
p;  terms to move by a certain percentage while pd  moves by a different 
percentage,  the  relative  price  of  each  tradable  (Pi’E[l + tj]/pd)  can 
nonetheless be kept constant by an offsetting movement in E. Such a 
move is stimulated when a country sets a new nominal exchange rate 
level by applying a purchasing power parity formula. 
The above examples show how much can be done while still main- 
taining the assumption that the prices of all tradables (or exportables, 
importables, exports, or imports, as the case may be) move together. 
But  obviously  there are many  problems  that  cannot  be dealt  with 
under that assumption. It is my impression  that on the whole those 
problems have been dealt with by using more of a partial-equilibrium 
framework. Examples are the analysis of the effects of a tariff or an 
export tax on a single commodity; the calculation of rates of effective 
protection; and the finding of second-best optima, such as the Ramsey 
problem of  choosing tariff rates for a subset of commodities so as to 
minimize the efficiency costs of  raising a given amount of  revenue 
therefrom. 
In at least one case-the  so-called Dutch disease problem of a dra- 
matic rise in the world price of a country’s principal export good-the 
nature  of  the problem  demanded  a macroeconomic framework and 
precluded the assumption of a composite export commodity. Here, in 
my  opinion, the analysis has on the whole been correct and to the 
point, but the relationship of this case to the other general-equilibrium 
problems discussed above was not, in general, made clear. 
In my view, we should try wherever possible to imbed our “par- 
tial”  analysis in  a general-equilibrium setting.  In the matter at hand 
this  means  we  should  couch  our  analysis  of  a  tariff  on a  single 
commodity  in  such a  way  that  when  imports  are viewed  as  being 
subjected one after another to a given tariff rate, until finally all are 
covered,  we  get  the  correct  answer  for  a  uniform  tariff.  Similar 
reasoning applies for export taxes and subsidies and for the various 
combinations discussed above, of uniform taxes and subsidies on all 
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This means, of  course, that we should recognize that each import 
tariff on each single good produces a downward shift in  the demand 
curve  for  foreign  exchange  and  a corresponding  downward  effect 
on the  real  exchange rate.  Likewise,  each  export  tax  on  a  single 
good  causes  a  leftward  shift  in  the  supply  curve  for  foreign  ex- 
change  and  a  corresponding  upward  effect  on  the  real  exchange 
rate. 
These facts cause no apparent difficulties until we realize that pJT  and 
(1 + tj) enter in a similar way in the expression for the relative price 
(P,*E[l  + tj]/pd)  of  imports of j. Just as we do not  want  to confine 
ourselves to analyzing only uniform tariffs or export taxes, so too do 
we not want to confine ourselves to cases in which all the pj* terms for 
all tradables move together. We  should strive for an analysis that can 
deal with changes in the price of individual export or import goods, or 
both, and one that can do so in such a way that the sum total of the 
individual effects on all  such goods is equal to the already well-recognized 
general-equilibrium result. 
Figures 11.3a, 11.3b, and 11.3~  illustrate how the demand and supply 
curves of foreign exchange (created by imports or exports of particular 
commodities) are altered when the world price of the relevant good 
changes. In figure 11.3a, the effect of doubling of the price of imports 
of goodj  is explored; in figure 11.3b, a doubling of the price of exports 
of good k is assumed. In each case what is shown is the demand curve 
for (or supply curve of) foreign exchange created by the market for 
the good in question. 
Each demand and supply curve is built on the assumption that the 
world price of the commodity in question is given. The units in which 
the horizontal axis is measured are units of a “dollar’s worth”-the 
amount of the commodity in question which at the given world price 
sells for a dollar. The units of  price are the demand or supply price 
(relative to the general level of prices, pd)  corresponding to each sep- 
arate quantity unit. 
Consider the case of a commodity, wheat (w),  selling in the world 
market for $4 a bushel. Its ordinary demand curve will measure bushels 
on the horizontal axis and the relative price of the bushel (p:E[l  + t,]/ 
pd)  on the vertical axis. To express this demand curve in units of dollar’s 
worth, stretch the quantity axis by multiplying by pt  ($4 in this case); 
the quantity units are now in dollar’s worth. Since the price of a dollar’s 
worth is (lip;) times the price of a bushel, the new price axis is mea- 
sured in units of E( l  + t,,,)/pd.  This expresses what demanders actually 
pay per dollar’s worth and includes the tariff or other tax received by 
the government. To produce a demand curve in which the demand price 
represents  the actual price  for foreign currency,  we  must  shift the 
ordinate of each point downward, dividing by (1 + t,,,).  The resulting 30 
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demand curve has dollars’ worth on one axis and E/pdr  the relative 
price of a dollar’s worth, on the other. 
Now when the world price of wheat pt  changes, this same transfor- 
mation must be performed again. Each ordinate of the curve must be 
multiplied by the old pt  ($4)  and divided by the new one (say, $8); 
similarly, the quantity of foreign exchange demanded at each price must 
be divided by the old p; and multiplied by the new one. This is what 
is done in figure 11.3, for a postulated doubling of the world price of 
the good in question. Figure 11.3a deals with a linear demand curve. 
In effect, it shifts from measuring demand in units of a quarter-bushel 
to measuring it in units of an eighth-bushel. Here as an initial step the 
vertical intercept is cut in half; this operation produces the broken-line 
curve. Then the abscissa of each point must be doubled (reflecting the 
doubled quantity of  dollars that each physical quantity unit, for ex- 
ample, each bushel, now  produces). This second step produces the 
new foreign currency demand curve created by imports ofj. 
Figure  11.3b does the same thing for an export supply curve. To 
obtain the (intermediate step) broken-line  curve, the height of each 
point on the old supply curve is cut in half; to obtain the new foreign 
currency supply curve created by exports of good k, the abscissa of 
each point on the broken-line curve is then doubled. 
Figure  11.3~  shows how  these transformations map a unit-elastic 
demand curve onto itself. Starting at point A we cut the height in half 
to get point B; then we double the quantity to get point A’-a  different 
point on the same unit-elastic demand curve with which we began. 
From figure 11.3~  it is also easy to visualize how, starting from a 
demand curve of a constant elasticity less than one, a rise in the world 
price of the commodity will result in a new demand curve (for foreign 
currency) that lies everywhere to the right of the original one. Likewise, 
if  we start from a demand curve of a constant elasticity greater than 
one, a rise in the world price will map that curve into a new demand 
curve for foreign currency that lies everywhere to the left of the original 
one. 
Thus, the Dutch disease phenomenon is not in any way limited to 
changes in the world price of the principal export(s) of a country. Even 
the least important export goods give rise to the same type of disease, 
only in very small doses. All import goods (except those with a for- 
tuitously unit-elastic demand curve) also generate, when their world 
prices change, effects on the real exchange rate. In cases in which there 
is domestic production of  the imported good or of close substitutes, 
the demand is likely to be of greater than unit elasticity, and a rise in 
world prices will cause a decline in the demand for foreign currency 
and in the real exchange rate. For imports of essential goods that are 
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mand is likely to be inela~tic,~  with a rise in world price producing an 
increase in the real exchange rate. 
All of this suggests a complex set of connections between the world 
prices of tradable goods and the real exchange rate. If one were trying 
to explain variations in the real exchange rate as resulting from changes 
in the world price of tradables, one would probably want to distinguish 
at least three separate explanatory variables: the world price level of 
the country’s exports, the world price level of its competitive imports, 
and the world price level of its noncompetitive imports. But even here 
the strength of the causal connection would differ from commodity to 
commodity within each category, depending on its individual elasticity 
of  import demand and export  supply. Hence, one has no particular 
reason to expect to find a particularly good (or “tight”)  empirical re- 
lationship between variations in the real exchange rate and changes in 
the separate price levels of exports and of the two classes of imports. 
Even less would one expect to find a good “fit” for equations depicting 
movements in the real exchange rate on the basis of changes in the 
terms of trade (the ratio of the world price level of exports to the world 
price  level of  all imports) or changes in  the world price  level of  a 
country’s tradable goods (typically a weighted average of  the price 
levels of its exports and all of its imports). 
This leads to the second main point of this section: how tricky or 
precarious it may be to think of the real exchange rate as the ratio of 
the price level of tradables to that of nontradables. This definition works 
without  any problem  when  the disturbance in question is a capital 
movement spent on nontradables, for in this case it follows from the 
nature of the disturbance that all tradables prices will move together 
(or remain constant while Ijd undergoes changes stemming from move- 
ments in nontradables prices). But in just about every other interesting 
case-a  world oil boom, looked at either from the standpoint of an oil- 
exporting or an oil-importing country; a reduction in the real costs of 
producing a particular tradable good, either locally  (as a backward 
country adopts a technology already known but new to it) or  worldwide 
(as in the “green”  revolution or the arrival of the computer age); the 
introduction or  relaxation  of  trade restrictions,  either selectively or 
across the board-differential  movements of tradables prices or dif- 
ferent forces influencing production separate one or more  tradables 
from the rest. In none of these cases is the ratio of tradables prices to 
that of  nontradables prices  particularly  illuminating or useful as an 
analytical concept or tool. For example, knowing precisely what hap- 
pens to this ratio does not  tell us how  the listed  disturbances  will 
influence the nominal exchange rate (E) in the event that the general 
level of  prices (pd)  is held constant, or what will happen to Ijd in the 
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More broadly, we should realize that just as we must use the unit of 
the dollar’s worth to measure the demand for imports and the supply 
of exports in determining the real exchange rate (E/pd)  as defined here, 
so too must we use that unit when talking about the demand for and 
supply of  importables and exportables. After all, the demand for im- 
ports (under the  small-country hypothesis) is nothing more nor less 
than the excess-demand curve obtained from juxtaposing the demand 
and the supply curves for importables; and the supply of exports is 
nothing but the excess-supply curve obtained when doing the same 
thing for exportables. Finally, of  course, the dollar’s worth has to be 
the unit for measuring the supply and demand for tradables-at  least 
if  we want to maintain the magnificently useful identity between the 
balance of trade and the excess supply of tradables. 
Thus, if this line of argument is correct, we should not put p,/p, (the 
price of tradables divided by the price of nontradables) on the vertical 
axis when we model demand and supply in the market for tradable 
goods. Rather, the vertical axis (in a timeless, comparative static anal- 
ysis) should be labeled E/pd,  just as it  is when  we  directly  analyze 
adjustment in the market for foreign exchange. 
Finally, we should also remember that the demand and supply curves 
of tradables themselves undergo shifts when world prices of particular 
import and export goods change, as well as when  tariffs, domestic 
excise taxes, export taxes and subsidies, and other types of distortions 
and restrictions are imposed.  I  come away from this entire exercise 
with a new respect for the old way of thinking about exchange rate 
determination as taking place in the market for foreign exchange. This 
way of thinking is not just a guide to the day-to-day  setting of the 
nominal exchange rate. It is also a sound guide to help us understand 
the forces determining the equilibrium real exchange rate E/pd. 
11.5  The Domestic Deflator, pd 
The matters treated in this and the next section are more practical 
than conceptual, having more to do with the actual indexes used in 
empirical work than with the underlying theory of the subject. At the 
purely theoretical level, we know that the real side of economics deals 
with real (as against nominal) quantities and with relative prices. At 
some point, therefore, one typically has to choose a numeraire com- 
modity-one in  terms  of  whose  price  the remaining prices are ex- 
pressed. The analysis to date has taken us part of the way down the 
road, in the sense that we have specifically singled out the world and 
internal prices  of  export(ab1e) and import(ab1e) goods, and we have 
recognized the possibility that the internal demand and supply prices 
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Relative to which price or price  level do we wish to express these 
various supply and demand prices of the different tradable goods? 
Although one could in theory pick any arbitrary good to serve as a 
n~meraire,~  this would miss the point; the numeraire would then have 
no particular economic content or meaning.  Our concern is to give 
specific content and meaning to what we have already identified as pd. 
As far as I  can see, there are only two reasonable candidates: (a) a 
general price index covering, in principle, all goods and services, in- 
cluding the tradables; and (b) a general index (pn)  of nontradable goods. 
If  I had to make the choice only at the theoretical level, I would be 
inclined to opt for (b), on the grounds that it is cleaner to work with 
a2px + a,p,J),  even though any given values of the former pair will 
imply specified values for the latter pair. 
But  if  I  intend  to use actual data-even of  estimated (or guessti- 
mated) elasticities of demand and supply-my  inclination tilts strongly 
toward option (a). In the first place, well-established indices of non- 
tradable goods, especially ones that are reliable and readily (and spee- 
dily) available, are typically not at hand. In the second place, nearly 
all of the elasticity estimates in the literature express relative prices as 
ratios of individual goods prices to a general index like the consumer 
price index or the GDP deflator. Not only are the numerical estimates 
derived in this way, but our intuitive sense as to the likely orders of 
magnitude is based, in  the final analysis, on  such estimates.  In the 
third place, when working through the theory of the international ad- 
justment mechanism under flexible exchange rates, it is much more 
reasonable to assume a monetary policy that is designed to stabilize 
(or otherwise take as its target) the general price index than to assume 
that it is  some nontradables price  index that  is being stabilized  (or 
targeted). Similarly, it is much more natural to think of the adjustment 
mechanism under fixed exchange rates as taking place through move- 
ments of  the money  supply and the general price level, rather than 
through movements of money and of the price level of  nontradables 
alone, since it is the general price level that presumably governs peo- 
ple’s behavior with respect to their holdings of money and other assets 
denominated in  money  terms.  This is true even in cases in  which, 
theoretically,  only movements in  nontradables prices  can cause the 
general price level to change. These are, as it were, the pure textbook 
cases; there are other textbook cases in which tradables prices would 
change (either exogenously or as a result of policy changes); and, of 
course, in the real world the prices of  some tradables or others are 
always changing. The general index of prices pd is under these circum- 
stances the deflating index that one can most rely on in  dealing with 
both theoretical and empirical problems. 
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Having opted, therefore, for the general index pd  rather than an index 
covering nontradables only, I will deal only briefly with the question 
of which index to use for pd.  To my mind, wholesale price indexes are 
everywhere very heavily weighted with tradables-the  mere fact that 
they are typically based on the prices  of  tangible and transportable 
goods practically guarantees that. Obviously, even though the deflating 
index is not a pure nontradables index, it should at least give them 
their due weight. Two widely used indexes that do this are the consumer 
price index (CPI) and the GDP (or GNP) deflator. Of  these the latter 
is the more comprehensive, but the former is (so long as it is formulated 
following accepted  professional  standards)  conceptually  sound, ac- 
ceptably general, and above all readily and quickly available (in nearly 
all countries), on a monthly as well as a quarterly and an annual basis. 
Thus, for most purposes I would choose the CPI as a deflator, probably 
reserving the GDP deflator mainly for historical time-series work where 
yearly data are all that is needed. 
11.6  The Dollar-Price or World-Price Deflator, p’ 
It is well to recall at the outset of this section that one does not need 
a dollar-price or world-price deflator for most analytical purposes. The 
nominal price of an import good at the country’s border is pLE; its 
relative price at the border is pfnE/pd;  and the relative price of a dollar’s 
worth of it at the border is simply E/pd.  This is true of each and every 
import good, at all times. The same can be said for export goods: their 
relative price at the border is p:E/pd, and the relative price of a dollar’s 
worth is always E/pd.  With this definition of the real exchange rate we 
can analyze tariffs, quantitative import restrictions, export taxes and 
subsidies, domestic taxes, domestic production subsidies, agricultural 
price supply programs, and changes in the world prices, pfn or p:, of 
particular imports or exports, or of groups of  them, or of all of them, 
recognizing,  of  course, that  some of  these  introduce distortions by 
which the relative prices paid for a dollar’s worth by domestic demand- 
ers, or received by domestic suppliers, or both, are different from the 
corresponding relative prices at the border. 
But when we thus argue the power of E/pd  as a measure of the real 
exchange rate, we should recognize that we are talking in the world of 
theory. Our analyses of things like tariffs and excise taxes are carried 
out in the timeless world of comparative statics. We  analyze policies 
or other disturbances one at a time (or in packages of our own choosing), 
with other potentially complicating factors held constant. Through it 
all, as explained earlier in this paper,  we  measure our quantities of 
tradable goods in units of the dollar’s worth. 
But what if the value of the dollar changes over time? This question 
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which the fact of  the dollar changing over time  is of  no particular 
moment. Thus, if a 50 percent uniform tariff causes E/pd  to  be 20 percent 
lower than it otherwise would be, this disincentive to export activity 
will presumably be present when the dollar-price level is 100, when it 
is 200, and when it is 500 as the dollar suffers the throes of inflation. 
The  presence  of  inflation  does  not  by  itself  alter  or  modify  the 
disincentive. 
Second, our precise purpose may be to analyze the effects of an 
inflationary process in the world (dollar) economy. This can be done 
(analytically) by assuming that all dollar prices of goods and services 
move up together. Obviously, once this assumption is made any dollar- 
price numeraire can be used to convert the “dollar’s worth” of different 
time periods into units of constant purchasing power. All will give the 
same answer. In particular, it does not matter whether we use an index 
(Plpk + p2p:)  of the dollar prices p:  and p: of the specific imports and 
exports of the country in question, or whether we use instead a more 
general dollar-price index p’; nor, if we use p*,  does it matter what its 
composition is. 
Third, we may be concerned with the empirical analysis of real-world 
data characterized by  ample fluctuations in the relative prices of in- 
dividual goods (and groups of goods) as well as irregular movements 
in the general dollar price level (however defined). Here we want to 
find  a deflating index that  defines a meaningful concept of  the real 
dollar’s worth. At this stage I would suggest ruling out goods in the 
nontradable category. For example, technological advance in the trad- 
ables category in the United States and other advanced countries can 
cause a rise in the dollar prices of nontradable goods and services while 
the general dollar price level of tradables stays relatively constant. One 
would not  expect such a change to cause an adjustment of the real 
exchange rate (properly defined) of a developing country. A simple way 
to ensure that this attribute also applies to our measure  of  the real 
exchange rate is to keep nontradable goods and services out of the 
index used to convert nominal dollars’ worth into real dollars’ worth. 
At this point I have limited our search for the relevant deflator to 
the subset of goods that I call tradable. I believe the most interesting 
question here is whether (a) we should use one index (based on the 
country’s own exports and imports) of the value of the dollar when we 
are talking of  the real exchange rate of Spain, another when we are 
dealing with the real exchange rate of India, a third for Colombia, and 
so on or (b) we should seek a common measure of the value of  the 
dollar to be used in all cases. 
The choice between (a) and (b) is not clear-cut or obvious, but my 
own inclination is strongly toward (b). In the first place, a country by 
its own trade policy can alter the composition of its tradables: it can 
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tariffs, and it can drive goods out of the export category simply through 
a policy  of  generally  heavy protectionism (leading to such a strong 
appreciation of the real exchange rate that many exports are rendered 
unprofitable).  On the whole, it  does not  seem appropriate for such 
policy-induced changes in the mix of a country’s traded goods to dictate 
changes in the index used to convert inflated dollars into dollars whose 
purchasing power is constant over time. 
Second, we  definitely want to be able to distinguish situations in 
which the disturbance is a change in the relative dollar price of one or 
more  key  commodities from one in  which a general world inflation 
prevails. An extreme example would be a country whose sole export 
was natural gas and whose principal imports were petroleum products. 
An energy price boom could then cause the dollar prices of both its 
exports (p:)  and its imports (pk) to rise by the same percentage. Even 
though this might have the same effect on the particular country as a 
general world inflation would, that similarity would be picked up in the 
analysis by working with the relative prices  (p:/p*) and (pk/p*) and 
using p*  as the general dollar-price deflator. This procedure seems to 
me  better than  ignoring p*  and using a country-specific term  (plpk 
+ pg:)  as the general dollar deflator. 
A third consideration is the fact that a fair amount of empirical work 
in international economics deals with cross-sections of countries. Here 
a definition of the real dollar’s worth  that  remains invariant as one 
moves from country to country (at any given time) has obvious appeal. 
Fourth, and in a similar vein, there are occasions a commodity-price 
rise has an impact on the economies of the countries producing or using 
that commodity. It would seem reasonable in such circumstances to 
deal with a rise in the relative dollar price of, say, oil that is the same 
for all countries. This, of course, would not be the case if  the general 
deflating index differed across countries, weighting the different com- 
modity prices by their relative importance in each country’s own trade. 
Particularly for a commodity like oil, which is practically the sole export 
in some producing countries and has a more moderate weight in others, 
differing weights for the commodity  in an index of  the form  (pip> 
+ p2p:)  might cause a doubling of oil prices to be reflected as changes 
of  very different percentages in the relative world-market price of oil 
in different countries. But this does not seem sensible to me. The price 
of oil, translated into local currency and expressed relative to the do- 
mestic general price level pd, will very likely differ from country to 
country, and in ways that reflect how the relative importance of oil in 
total output, exports, consumption, and so on differs among countries. 
But here I am not talking of the relative price of oil (p;E[1  + tj]/pd) 
within Nigeria, Indonesia, or Venezuela. Instead I am talking about its 
relative price (p;/p*) in  the world market. The former relative  price 
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and explain this. I see no reason, however, why the relative price of 
oil in the world or  dollar economy should differ from country to  country. 
1 therefore propose that the index p* for converting nominal dollars’ 
worth into real dollars’ worth be an index of the dollar prices of tradable 
goods and that the weights used for the different goods in this index 
should not vary as we move from one developing country to another. 
I allow for the possibility that in a particular developing country the 
relative prices of both its importables and its exportables could rise (or 
fall) during a given period; the analysis then would capture the total 
effect of such a change as being similar, for the country concerned, to 
that of a general world inflation. 
The single index p‘  can be thought of as an index of the prices of 
tradable goods  “somewhere  on the high  seas.”  The analogy  is apt 
because it clearly connotes that there is no principle dictating that it 
should be an index of U.S. prices, or German prices, or U.K. prices. 
Throughout this paper I have talked of the dollar’s worth as the unit 
of measurement of tradables. This is clearly the result of the dominance 
of the U.S. dollar as the key currency during the past few decades and 
of its likely continued importance into the next few. As a consequence 
of  this role of  the dollar, many international trade statistics are mea- 
sured in terms of dollars; this creates a pragmatic necessity for a deflator 
to convert these nominal dollar data into real terms. 
The most natural, readily available index for doing this job is the 
U.S. wholesale price index. But it is not difficult to convert the German, 
British, or Japanese wholesale price indexes into dollar terms by mul- 
tiplying by the dollar price of the mark, the pound, or the yen. On this 
basis we could then create a dollar wholesale price index based, say, 
on the relative weights of the different major currencies in the SDR 
(that is, Special Drawings Rights, the unit, a basket of major currencies, 
in which credit from the International Monetary Fund is measured). 
The index would then be not a U.  S  .-price index but a dollar-price index, 
one that could appropriately be used to deflate trade statistics expressed 
in dollars and to trace over time the real exchange rates reflecting the 
price of the dollar in different countries’ domestic currencies. 
One alternative to the use of wholesale price indexes is to work with 
those components of GDP deflators that are most readily identifiable 
as relating to tradables. These are clearly those for the manufacturing, 
agricultural (including forestry and cattle raising), and mining sectors. 
With these components it would be easy to construct for any country 
a national index of tradables prices. 
Once again one could here think of using the U.S. “tradables GDP 
deflator” as the relevant index, or alternatively a weighted average of 
several countries’ “tradables GDP deflators,” each converted into dol- 
lar terms by the relevant dollar exchange rate of the respective coun- 
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respect to both the definition of tradable goods (here, manufactures 
plus agricultural  and mineral products) and the weights with which 
their prices are combined in each country (that is, the relative weights 
they have in the corresponding GDP). The disadvantages of this index 
are that it is never available on a monthly basis (and not always even 
quarterly) and that it often appears with a long lag and in relatively 
obscure sources. 
My vote for work to be done in the near future would be to use the 
U.S. wholesale price index as the deflator for the dollar values of trade. 
If  consensus regarding the conceptual framework is approached, one 
can hope that the International Monetary Fund might begin to publish 
(in Znternational Financial  Statistics)  monthly indexes of the wholesale 
prices  in a number of major countries (say, those whose currencies 
compose the SDR), converted into dollars by the relevant exchange 
rate and also, if  possible, averaged together (presumably  with SDR 
weights).  Once  such an index  was  regularly  calculated and  readily 
available, I believe it could claim superiority over the U.S. wholesale 
price index for the purpose at hand. 
It is also my belief that indexes based on components of the GDP 
deflator, either of the United States alone or of a combination of coun- 
tries, will be useful in the future, but for rather more restricted purposes 
than those based on wholesale price series. Nonetheless, I believe the 
time is ripe for researchers to make imaginative use of price indexes 
of tradables baskets that are built up from corresponding components 
of GDP deflators. 
11.7  Reflections and Conclusions 
The writing of  this paper has been much more difficult than I had 
initially anticipated. The process has been sobering, too; among other 
things I have come to appreciate how a concept of the real exchange 
rate that is simple and obvious in one context can lead one seriously 
astray in others. 
Among the contending concepts are (a) the price level of a country’s 
tradables deflated by that of its nontradables, (b) the nominal exchange 
rate deflated by a general price index, (c) the nominal exchange rate (for 
example, the peso price of the dollar) double deflated by a peso-price 
index and a dollar-price index of a similar concept, and (d) the nominal 
exchange rate deflated by an index of nominal wages and salaries. 
Of these, concept (a) is very naturally suitable in examining problems 
of international capital movements and the transfer problem generally; 
concept (b) is quite appropriate for dealing with internal inflation in the 
country in question, as well as for handling other policies,  such as 
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of  a century in  the literature  on purchasing power parity,  and it  is 
appropriate when monetary movements take place at different rates in 
the country in question and in the rest of the world; and (d) is powerful 
medicine, forcefully bringing home the fact that a required devaluation 
of  the real exchange rate often necessarily entails a fall in real wages 
and salaries. 
Being a firm believer that language (and communication in general) 
must always be understood in the context in which it is imbedded, I 
am not too uncomfortable with the thought that these and other com- 
peting notions  of  the real exchange rate will probably  swirl through 
economic discourse for years to come. But  I  am  quite  a bit  more 
uncomfortable with that idea now than I was before I undertook writing 
this paper. The trouble is that, unlike such issues as whether demand 
elasticities are defined as positive or negative and whether an exchange 
rate is taken to be the dollar price of the peso or the peso price of the 
dollar-which  are simple ones-the  issues raised by the different usages 
of the real exchange rate are complex. Moreover, the problems involved 
are not widely appreciated, so that people who are thinking in terms 
of  one concept may  well find  unintelligible or downright  stupid the 
things that are said by others who have a different concept in mind. 
So complex and intertwined are the issues that I am supremely con- 
fident of only one thing: Despite the best efforts of myself and others, 
much confusion will surround the concept of  the real exchange rate 
for a long time to come. 
I have been chastened, also, in writing this paper by the fact that all 
too recently  I  myself  used  the above concepts more or  less  inter- 
changeably, at times explicitly listing concepts (a), (c), and (d) as three 
guises in which the real exchange rate appears. How fateful  that  I 
should  now  come forward as a defender  of  concept (b) and as an 
advocate of yet another concept, (e), double deflation using an index 
of the world prices of  tradables as the foreign deflator and a general 
index like the CPI as the domestic deflator! But so it is. 
The first task (or test) that I would require of a concept of the real 
exchange rate is that it  correctly replicate simple textbook cases of 
exchange rate determination. This is done admirably by the concept 
(E/pd),  so long as the general price level in the rest of the world is taken 
as given. 
In figure  11.1 I dealt with six disturbances, assuming a flexible ex- 
change rate and a monetary policy that held the general internal price 
level pd constant. They were the imposition of  a general tariff,  the 
imposition of a general export tax, an inflow of capital spent on tradable 
goods, an inflow of  capital spent on nontradable goods, a rise in the 
world price of a country’s exports, and a rise in the world price of a 
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These cases gave the familiar and expected answers, but in the pro- 
cess it  was underscored that (for the flexible rate case, at least) the 
exchange rate is a price that is set in the market  for  foreign exchange. 
The units that are demanded and supplied are dollars of  foreign ex- 
change. To link this fact to the demand for imports and the supply of 
exports, we must measure the quantity of each individual import and 
export good in units that have a given value (say, one dollar) in the 
world market. Based on this assumption we can construct demand and 
supply curves for foreign exchange and determine the equilibrium ex- 
change rate. One key result was that the demand and supply curves 
for foreign exchange shift when the world prices of import and export 
commodities change, causing changes in the nominal exchange rate for 
a given pd. 
Figure  11.2 presented my first explicit introduction to the real ex- 
change rate. I there explored the process of adjustment to disturbances 
like those in figure 1  1.1, only now under the assumption that the nom- 
inal exchange rate was fixed. Here, as is well known, the adjustment 
process works through monetary expansion and contraction; identical 
results to those of the first figure are obtained, however, when the price 
of foreign currency is expressed as E/pd.  In figure 11.1 the adjustment 
is in the numerator of this expression; in figure 11.2 it is in the denom- 
inator. 
The concept  E/pd is exceedingly robust. Using it one can handle 
essentially all types of disturbances originating in the domestic econ- 
omy and basically any relevant disturbance originating abroad (since 
the only channels through which foreign disturbances would enter the 
picture are movements of capital and changes in the world prices of 
tradable goods and services). The only flaw I find in using E/pd  as the 
general and definitive concept of the real exchange rate is the fact that 
its equilibrium value falls (signifying an appreciation of  the peso or 
other local currency) when there is a general world (or dollar) inflation. 
Where world (or dollar) inflation is not an intrinsic part of the picture 
(for example, in any and all theoretical analyses of the consequences 
of domestic policies and other domestic disturbances), E/pd  is, I believe, 
the correct concept to use. 
Where world inflation is the problem (or an integral part of the prob- 
lem), the concept of the real exchange rate can be made more nearly 
symmetrical by introducing a world-price deflator p'  along with the 
domestic price deflator pd. The real exchange rate concept then be- 
comes p*E/pd.  This is a natural extension of the original concept; when 
the real  value  of  the dollar is not changing, we  can treat the basic 
demand and supply as being for the dollar's worth of foreign exchange. 
When the real value of the dollar is changing, basic demand and supply 
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But note that if  we fail to introduce p’  into the expression for the 
real exchange rate, the consequences are not cataclysmic; we simply 
obtain an expression that could be denominated “the real peso price 
of the dollar, uncorrected for dollar inflation.” This type of index has 
in fact been widely and quite successfully used in cases of countries 
experiencing very rapid inflation. 
Of  the alternative concepts of  the real exchange rate mentioned at 
the outset of this section, the one I consider most vulnerable is p,/p,, 
the ratio of the price level of tradables to the price level of nontradables. 
Taken at face value, this index simply gives the wrong answer too much 
of the time.  The right answers to questions concerning the real ex- 
change rate are those represented in figure 1 1.1. Of the six disturbances 
there considered, the concept pl/p, does well for only two: a capital 
inflow spent on tradables (for which the supply of tradables would shift 
to the right by the amount of the capital inflow and the demand would 
shift likewise, leaving p,/p, unchanged); and a capital inflow spent on 
nontradables (adjustment to which would require that an excess de- 
mand for tradables be generated, causing a fall in the equilibrium level 
of PAP,).  An import tariff and an export tax would each have an am- 
biguous effect on the price level of tradables, since one component of 
it (the price level of importables) would rise under either of  the two 
disturbances, while the other component (the price level of exportables) 
would fall. Whichever one of these two dominated, the effect on p,/p, 
would be the same under either a general import tariff or a general 
export tax that introduced the same gap between the price levels of 
importables and exportables, respectively.  As the analyses of figures 
1 1.1 and 11.2 show, however, the real exchange rate must unequivocally 
fall in the case of a general tariff and rise in the case of a general export 
tax. The concept p,/p, therefore cannot give the right answer in these 
cases. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to changes in the 
world prices of specific tradable goods. A rise in the world price of 
exports (alone) must cause a fall in the equilibrium real exchange rate. 
Yet  since exportables are an important component of tradables (they 
could be much more than half or much less than a half, even with 
balanced trade, because of the existence of  domestic consumption of 
exportables and domestic production of  importables), the effect of a 
rise in export prices might cause the index p,/p, to rise, or to fall, or 
to remain the same. Here again p,/p, does not lead us to the correct 
answer. 
We  have seen that the effect of a rise in import prices on the demand 
for foreign currency (and hence on the real exchange rate) will depend 
on the price elasticity of import demand, the effect being nil with unit 
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demand. The elasticity of import demand does not even come into play 
when one considers the ratio PAP,;  this ratio musf rise if  the world 
prices of  imports rise while those of  exports remain the same. Thus, 
p,/p, once again gives the wrong answer. 
In my view, two correct answers out of six is not good enough. Even 
worse, an extension of the analysis to cover other types of domestically 
imposed  distortions-such  as quotas, price  supports, and  domestic 
taxes and subsidies-would  reveal still further failures of the p,/p, con- 
cept to predict reliably what would happen to the nominal exchange 
rate under conditions of a stable general (or for that matter a stable 
nontradables) price level. 
The use of the ratio pip, has yet another defect: it diverts attention 
from the necessity of measuring both the demand for and the supply 
of tradables in dollars’ worth. (Actually, if  this is done, and if  pt is 
explicitly defined as the internal price at the border [that is, without 
tariffs, taxes, or subsidies] of a dollar’s worth of  tradable goods, the 
pJp, ratio can be rehabilitated.) The p,/p, concept focuses attention on 
tradables and nontradables as two bundles of goods and services com- 
peting for the interest of demanders and for the application of resources 
by  suppliers. One’s instinct  is to treat those bundles symmetrically, 
when what is called for instead is an asymmetric treatment. One is also 
inclined to treat tradables as a single bundle, when familiar disturbances 
require the separation of importables from exportables and often the 
breaking down of these categories into individual commodities or groups. 
In general the p,/p, concept can be amended to produce the right 
answers when it is employed. Two basic elements are involved here. 
First, exportables and importables must be expressed in units of “dol- 
lars’ worth.”  When this is done, and for “properly defined”  curves, 
the excess-demand curve for importables becomes the demand curve 
for imports, the excess-supply curve of exportables becomes the supply 
curve for exports, and we are back in a framework of the supply and 
demand for foreign exchange. But we must work hard to “define prop- 
erly”  the demand and supply curves of importables and exportables. 
In general we must make beforehand the necessary corrections so that 
the tradables price reflected on the curve is the border price of a dollar’s 
worth of tradables. Thus, for a tariff the demand for and supply of 
exportables would remain untampered with, but the height of the supply 
and demand curves for importables could be reduced by the amount 
of the tariff.  There would be an outward shift of the supply of  im- 
portables and an inward shift of demand, with the result that the supply 
curve of tradables (importables plus exportables) would shift outward; 
and the demand curve inward, producing a fall in the equilibrium real 
exchange rate (PAP, in this modified framework). For any disturbance 
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of and demand for exportables or importables, or both, that will result 
in  the correct final result. The underlying principle  here is that the 
equilibrium pr in the pip, ratio must always be the border price, net 
of  import tariff, gross of export tax, gross of import subsidy, net of 
export subsidy, and so on. It must always be what an import buyer 
pays per dollar’s worth of  a (hypothetical if  necessary) nondistorted 
import good, or what an exporter receives for selling a dollar’s worth 
of a nondistorted export good. Once this is done, the p,/p, framework 
is rehabilitated. I doubt, however, that the result is worth the effort, 
since other means exist of reaching the same conclusions more directly 
and simply. 
The other concepts of  the real exchange rate are more easily em- 
ployed. To use the nominal exchange rate divided by an index of wages 
and salaries is just like using E/pd,  with the general internal price level 
being represented by the wages and salary level.  (Actually, the cor- 
rected pip, ratio, just discussed, substitutes pn  for pd in the same way.) 
None of the above are corrected for foreign inflation-which  for solving 
many analytical problems is not necessary and which may not be nec- 
essary in dealing with particular practical ones. 
If one is to correct for foreign inflation, I do not believe that deep 
theoretical considerations enter seriously into the choice of the index 
to be used. Foreign CPI indexes and foreign GDP deflators have been 
widely used, particularly in tandem with domestic price deflators (pd) 
based on the same concept. Since the nontradables of the rest of  the 
world have little connection to a given developing country’s economy, 
I prefer to use as a foreign price deflator p’, which explicitly concen- 
trates on tradable goods. And I prefer a general dollar-price index to 
one that is based on a country’s own tradables weights. For practical 
reasons I prefer a dollar-price index that is quickly and readily available. 
The U.S. wholesale price index meets this criterion, as does a weighted 
average of the wholesale price indexes of major trading nations, con- 
verted to a dollar basis using the exchange rates of their respective 
currencies vis-a-vis the dollar. 
An alternative would be to use for p* the tradable component of the 
U.S. GDP deflator or a weighted average of the corresponding com- 
ponents of the GDP deflators of the major trading nations (once again 
converted to a dollar basis using the prevailing exchange rates). Indexes 
based on GDP (or GNP, as the case may be) deflators probably have 
greater conceptual clarity, but they are not available monthly and are 
quite slow to appear. Of the options available for precisely defining the 
composition  of p*/pd,  I would at the one extreme opt for the U.S. 
wholesale price index as representing p* and the country’s own con- 
sumer price index as representing pd. This option is useful for work 
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other extreme I would consider an index constructed from agricultural, 
mining, and manufacturing components of the U.S.  GNP deflator for 
p’  and the individual country’s own total GDP deflator for pd. This 
option is appropriate largely for time-series work that requires annual 
data. It should be clear that these are preferences, not choices deter- 
mined by profound analytical dictates. In other words, there is much 
room for fruitful debate over and experimentation with different indexes. 
A final note concerns the design of empirical work aimed at explain- 
ing movements over time in the real exchange rate. The analysis of 
this paper suggests a partial list of explanatory variables that might be 
useful; it also carries warnings that certain variables might not be useful 
at all, and still others only in restricted cases. An ideal list of explan- 
atory variables  would  certainly include  net  capital inflow  spent on 
tradable goods, net capital inflow spent on nontradable goods, the world 
price level of  a country’s exports, the world price level of  its compet- 
itive imports, the world price level of its noncompetitive imports, the 
average strength of tariffs and other restrictions inhibiting import de- 
mand, and the average strength of  export taxes (subsidies) and other 
policies inhibiting (or promoting) export supply. 
The above list is only partial, as I have limited it to items explicitly 
discussed in this paper. Nonetheless, it clearly shows how difficult is 
the task of empirically explaining movements in the real exchange rate. 
We  rarely have breakdowns as to the types of goods on which a coun- 
try’s foreign borrowings are spent, yet we know that only the part spent 
on nontradables should influence the real exchange rate. In examining 
small countries we usually can obtain world prices for a few principal 
exports, but import prices  are difficult to come by, especially if  we 
want to classify them into competitive or noncompetitive imports (or 
other categories that distinguish groups with different import demand 
elasticities). We  usually have average receipts from import tariffs, but 
we have little clue as to the strength (and the variation over time) of 
nontariff barriers. The story is similar with the incentives (particularly 
the disguised ones) that countries often give to certain export activities. 
The list is interesting  for the variables  it  includes, and  it  is  also 
sobering in light of how difficult it is (in many cases) to approximate 
the actual variables one has to use to the desired ones. But the woes 
of empirical workers are familiar, particularly those related to the failure 
of actual data series to measure what one really wants. 
Let me therefore end on a more positive note. The above list inten- 
tionally excludes the terms-of-trade (the ratio of export to import prices) 
variable  in  favor of  separating it into components. The lesson is to 
avoid trying to work with this variable as an explainer of real exchange 
rates changes. The list explicitly includes  export taxes  as variables 
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portant (and variable over time) in a number of countries (among them 
Argentina and Uruguay), but to my knowledge they have not been used 
in real exchange rate regressions. Also useful are the concept of net 
foreign borrowing as a separate argument in the demand functions for 
different categories of goods and the concept of the fraction of foreign 
borrowing  spent on tradables as being important in  determining  its 
ultimate effect on the real exchange rate. These observations, derived 
from analyzing the underlying concept and measurement of  the real 
exchange rate, may ultimately be of use in empirical investigations that 
attempt to explain its variations. 
Appendix: Impact of  a Rise in Pj* on the Real 
Exchange Rate 
Analysis of Substitution Effects 
This is not the place for an extended treatment introducing further 
complications to the above analysis. But I cannot avoid examining at 
least in  passing the situation in which the demand for imports of  the 
good whose  world  price  changes is  not  independent,  say, of  other 
tradables  prices.  The issue at stake is  standard  in  the demand for 
composite commodities, and it  is much like the difference between 
long-run and short-run marginal cost curves.  Assuming gross substi- 
tutability in all relevant respects, we will have, at any viable equilibrium 
position (i) a demand curve (00 in figure 11.4) for imports of j that 
assumes all other tradables prices move together with that ofj  (that is, 
tradables prices move as the exchange rate moves) and (ii) a demand 
curve (D’D’)  for imports ofj  that assumes only pj* moves, while other 
import prices remain constant at their previous level. Assuming that 
importj  is a gross substitute for the rest of the tradables, we find that 
DD*  will be more elastic than 00. 
Consider A‘ in figure 11.4 to be a point like A’ in figure 11.3a. Imagine 
having started from a point like A in figure 11.3a, with that equilibrium 
being disturbed by a rise in pJ*.  There would be a curve like D’D  and 
one like 00 through A;  the two demand curves depicted in figure 11.4 
are the “remappings” of these original curves as a consequence of the 
rise in pj. Likewise, A’ is simply the remapping of the original point 
A.  Any adjustment involved must take off from this point. Since only 
pj” has changed, it would seem at first glance that the new equilibrium 
would be at C.  But one must ask what is the meaning of the distance 
(CF)  between  D’D’  and 00 at this  point.  Obviously,  this  distance Exch 
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represents the additional substitution that takes place against good j, 
when other tradables prices are held constant rather than moving up 
from A‘ pan passu with pj*.  But if  people are substituting away fromj 
and toward other tradables, the excess supply curve of foreign ex- 
change arising out of  these other tradables markets will shift to the 
left. Thus, point C  is not an equilibrium point, as it is on the old excess 
supply curve, but not on the shifted one. 
Actually, the new equilibrium must be at C‘ (neglecting income ef- 
fects). Remembering that the units of tradables are being measured in 
“dollars’ worths”; the extra substitution (at a given price) away from 
goodj and toward other tradables must cause the demand for those 
other tradables to expand by a like amount. This in turn causes the 
excess supply curve of other tradables to shift to the left by the same 
amount. The distance C’F’is thus at one and the same time the leftward 
shift in the excess supply curve of other tradables and the extra sub- 
stitution in demand of  favor of these other tradables because only pj* 
(not all tradables prices) has risen. The end result of the whole process 
is  that  the equilibrium exchange rate falls from E,  to E’.  It is thus 
exactly as if one had moved up on DD from A’ to F’,  neglecting entirely 
the fact that it was only pj* that changed and forgetting entirely about 
DD‘  and S’S’. 
Thus, we need be concerned with only one demand curve for imports 
of good j-that  represented by Do. When pj* changes, this curve will 
be remapped, as shown in figure 11.3a, but no serious complexities are 
introduced by the changing of only one (or any subset) of the world 
prices of importable goods. Demand curves will be displaced, down- 
ward or upward depending on their elasticities of demand at the points 
in question, but we do not have to bring in new concepts of demand 
to take care of the case of nonindependence. 
The same story holds for the supply of exports. One can visualize a 
supply curve of  exports of good k, built on the assumption that  all 
tradables prices move together, and another built on the assumption 
that the other prices are held constant, while only pi moves. The dif- 
ference between these two curves at an exchange rate like E’ will be 
(for a rise in  pi) the substitution (in demand, for present  purposes) 
against good k and in favor of  other tradables-something  that does 
not occur if all tradables prices move together. One of the two supply 
curves will be like D*D* in being based on the assumption that only 
the price of  k rises, while the prices of other tradables remain fixed. 
Along this supply curve and the old excess demand curve for tradable 
goods other than k, there will be a point analogous to C. This will not 
be an equilibrium because it fails to take into account that any substi- 
tution away from k and toward other tradables will shift to the left, by 
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that set of markets. Thus, the new equilibrium will be at a point like 
C' where the extra substitution away from good k is just offset by the 
rightward shift in the excess demand for foreign exchange. Again, in 
short, one can operate with the supply-side counterpart of the demand 
curve ED without having to concern oneself with the counterpart of 
DD'. Substitution effects among the tradables end up cancelling them- 
selves out. 
Analysis of Income Effects 
It remains to speak about income effects. These are dealt with ex- 
plicitly in figures 11.5a and 11.5b. I have just shown that we can work 
with tradables demand and supply curves built on the assumption of a 
pari  passu  movement  of  all  tradables  prices,  so far as substitution 
effects are concerned. The course of prudence is to thank God for this 
bit of largesse (in clarifying our thoughts and simplifying our tasks), 
and build our analysis of  income effects around it. Once we realize 
this, a neat trick can be brought into play. Rather than work with excess 
demand and excess supply curves of the D'D'  type, why not continue 
to work with 00  and its supply-side counterpart? We  know that if pj* 
(for an import) rises, the induced change in real income (measured in 
dollars) is -  MJdpT,  where Mj  denotes imports of good j  and dpj* denotes 
the percentage change in the world price of j (recall that all tradables 
are expressed in units whose price is one dollar). This change in income 
will be spread among commodities in  accordance with the respective 
marginal propensities pi  of the society to spend on each of them. Since 
some of them are exportables and some importables, the consequence 
is that both the compensated excess demand curve and the compen- 
sated supply curve will be shifted by the income effect. This is a painful 
thought, especially since any given equilibrium real exchange rate can 
be the result of a number of different disturbances, each of which have 
different effects on the real income of the society. 
Now for the trick. Instead of trying to incorporate the income effect 
of a given disturbance into the excess demand and supply relations we 
are dealing with, why not insert it as a wedge between the two com- 
pensated curves? In that case we need only break down the income 
effect  into  two  fractions:  p1 spent  on  tradables,  and  pn spent  on 
nontradables. 
Figure 11.5a is built like figure 11.3a, except now we know that we 
can work with SS as it stands and with the remapped (00)  in seeking 
the new equilibrium. Some of the change in real income will result in 
reduced spending on tradables other thanj. This will cause SS to shift 
to the right by an amount equal to (pt - p,)Mjdpj*.  It will also lead to 50 
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less spending on good j itself. This will cause the import demand curve 
forj  to shift to the left by the amount p&fJdpj*.  The sum of these two 
shifts is always p, MJdpj*,  whatever the import good we happen to call 
good j.  Thus, if we know pt MJdpJ,  we know the size of the wedge to 
insert between SS  and 00  in figure 11 Sa,  and this is enough to tell us 
where the equilibrium exchange rate, 8,  will be, after accounting for 
income effects. (Of course, we will need to know the separate value 
of  pj in order to determine the equilibrium value of  the abscissa, in 
cases in which that is required.) 
Figure 11.5b shows the counterpart of this situation for a rise in the 
world price of  export good k.  The remapping of  the excess (export) 
supply curve of good k is done just as in  figure 11.3b. Recall that at 
A' exporters would be replicating the situation at  A, providing the same 
quantity and receiving the same peso price.  The point at which the 
excess demand curve for foreign exchange from the rest of the tradable 
sector crosses the remapped supply curve for exports of  k would call 
for equilibrium at E'.  But this will not hold in the presence  of real 
income effects. Properly, the demand curve would shift to the right by 
(p, - pk)Xkdl);, and  the  remapped  (SS) would  shift  to the left  by 
pkXkdp;.  But we can obtain the same equilibrium result by inserting a 
wedge equal to pt Xkdp; between the excess demand curve and the 
remapped (SS).  When this is done, the equilibrium exchange rate E 
results. 
Notes 
1.  This paper is explicitly designed as an introduction; I have attempted to make it 
accessible to students and to other readers with limited formal training in economics, 
as well  as to seasoned professionals  in  the  field.  Although  the last  group may  find 
much of the expository material familiar, I believe that the analysis as a whole enables 
us to see more clearly than we have been able to from the literature to date some of 
the main  issues surrounding  the  concept and the measurement  of the real  exchange 
rate. A more extended exposition of some of this material can be found in Harberger 
(1985). 
2.  This point will be treated in more detail in section  11.4. 
3.  Once again, for further elaboration of the relevant analysis, see section  11.4. 
4.  There are some interesting  technical  relationships  among the  elasticities  of de- 
mand  for  imports  and  for  tradables  in  general.  These  are  briefly  explored  in  the 
appendix. 
5. This is what is done in mathematical treatments of most general-equilibrium prob- 
lems. The other general-equilibrium tradition has its roots in international trade theory; 
it deals with a relatively small number of identifiable commodity groups, one of which 
perforce ends up being chosen as the numeraire. This choice is what we are concerned 
with here. 413  Economic Adjustment and the Real Exchange Rate 
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Comment  Carlos Diaz-Alejandro 
An admiring connoisseur of smorgasbord is selective. Faced with Har- 
berger’s rich table, I will dwell on  just two of his servings: the definition 
of the “world  dollar price level”  relevant for developing countries 
(LDCs), and exchange rate policy differences among LDCs and be- 
tween LDCs and developed countries. 
Defining the world dollar price level relevant for LDCs is far from 
an unimportant or easy matter.  Debates over imported inflation, ex- 
change rate policy, and the real cost of servicing the external debt have 
gained in acrimony in recent years, partly due to the use of different 
yet plausible statistics for that price level. In Argentina and Chile, for 
example, those who defended  government policies during the years 
1978-80 argued that the world price level relevant to those two coun- 
tries was rising at an annual rate of  30  percent per annum (more than 
double the inflation in  U.S. wholesale prices), so that persistent local 
inflation, a sluggish pace of domestic currency devaluation, and heavy 
borrowing abroad were easier to explain and justify. 
Carlos Diaz-Alejandro was a professor of economics at Columbia University before 
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Since 1972 severe changes in relative prices in the world economy 
have indeed generated a rich menu of candidates for the world price 
level, depending on how different goods and services are weighted. 
For long-term trends  this  is, of  course, less of a problem  than for 
exercises involving two or three years. The already mentioned two- 
year period,  1978-80,  during which  some of  the most  adventurous 
Southern Cone policies were implemented, coincided with particularly 
turbulent and confusing fluctuations in international relative prices. 
Table C1 1  .  1 collects a variety of indicators for dollar inflation during 
the period 1972-83. Over the whole 11-year period there is a clustering 
between 7 and  11 percent per annum, using the most plausible indi- 
cators. But international dollar prices for LDC imports, including oil, 
seem to have risen more than price indexes for the U.S. economy. A 
difference of a couple of percentage points per annum can, of course, 
cumulate to a very significant gap over 11 years. Export unit values 
for Argentina, Brazil, and Chile show an inflationary trend distinctly 
lower than that of the U.S. price indexes and, a fortiori, than that for 
their imports. Note that the simple averages for import and export price 
inflation in those three Latin American countries over the 1  1-year pe- 
riod are very close to the U.S. measures of inflation. For  all nonoil 
LDCs, the simple average of export and import inflation works out 
only a shade higher than that for U.S. wholesale prices, a generalization 
that can be extended to the domestic inflation of two classic, very open, 
small Latin American economies, Haiti and Panama, which have main- 
tained rigid pegs to the U.S. dollar for many years. Over the long term 
the U.S. wholesale price index does well as a measure of dollar infla- 
tion, even for international prices, supporting Harberger’s suggestion. 
In short periods of only two years, however, we are in trouble. Table 
C1  1  .  1 documents the turbulence and unevenness in dollar price  be- 
havior during the periods  1972-74  and  1978-80.  Although the U.S. 
wholesale price index did show more sensitivity than U.S. consumer 
prices and the GNP deflator, it lagged behind most international dollar 
prices during those two-year periods. But apologists for Southern Cone 
policies grossly exaggerated that gap for 1978-80.  Given the numbers 
in table C1  1  .  1  ,  it would be difficult to argue that the international dollar 
inflation relevant for the Southern Cone during 1978-80  went beyond 
a range of 18 to 22 percent per annum. Interestingly, a higher number 
could be justified for international inflation (and its gap vis ?i  vis that 
in U.S. wholesale prices) during 1972-74.  Note that in Haiti and Pan- 
ama annual inflation during 1978-80  remained in the 11 to 15 percent 
range, somewhat lower than during 1972-74. 
Of  all  subperiods shown in  the table,  1974-78  exhibits the most 
1960s-type, placid behavior. Inflation measures cluster. Only the col- 
lapsing Argentine and Chilean dollar export prices deviated much from 
the 7 percent per annum norm. 416  Arnold C. Harberger 
Table C1l.l  Selected Indexes of Annual Rates of Dollar Inflation, 1972-83, in 
Percentages 
Index  1972-83  1972-74  1974-78  1978-80  1980-83 
Nonoil LDCs’ import unit values  I1  34 
Brazilian import unit values  12  34 
Industrial countries’ export unit values  8  22 
Nonoil LDCs’ export unit values  9  34 
Argentine export unit values  6  35 
Argentine import unit values  10  32 
Chilean import unit values  11  27 
Brazilian export unit values  6  30 
Chilean export unit values  5  41 
Western Hemisphere export unit  10  37 
7  20 
9  11 
6  24 
10  22 
8  14 
6  16 
-3  20 
59 
-5  21 









-  11 
-5 
values 
Industrial countries’ import unit values  10  31  7  21  -4 
U.S.  wholesale prices  9  16  7  13  4 
U.S.  consumer prices  8  8  7  12  7 
Panamanian consumer prices  7  12  5  11  5 
Panamanian wholesale prices  11  20  9  15  7 
Haitian consumer prices  11  19  7  15  9 
U.S.  GNP implicit price deflator  7  7  79  6 
Sources: Data on Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean import and export dollar unit values 
obtained from worksheets of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin Amer- 
ica, courtesy of Andres Bianchi. Data on the U.S. GNP implicit price deflator obtained 
from U.S.  Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report ofthe President (Washing- 
ton, D.C.:  GPO, 1984), table B-3, p. 224. All other data obtained from International 
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Yearbook  1984, and January  1985 
(Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1984 and 1985). The Yearbook 1984 does not present a Western 
Hemisphere import unit value; such a series is presented in the  January 1985 Znternarional 
Financial Statistics, starting in 1979. “Nonoil LDCs” refers to line 201 in the Interna- 
tional Financial Statistics; “Western Hemisphere” refers to line 205; “Industrial coun- 
tries”  refers to line 110. 
The most recent subperiod, 1980-83,  presents a remarkable picture: 
international deflation coexisted with  mild  U.S.  inflation. Again the 
U.S. wholesale price index behaved closest to international prices, yet 
a significant gap remained, as during 1972-74  and 1978-80,  but with 
a different sign. It is tempting to speak of U.S. inflation catching up 
with the higher international price inflation of 1972-80, or perhaps more 
accurately, of international deflation during 1980-83 wringing out some 
of the 1972-80  “excess”  international inflation. What is more certain 
is that if  one is calculating ex post real interest rates on the Latin 
American debt, a gloomier view emerges when using some weighted 
sum of  international prices than the already dismal picture one would 
obtain using U.S. price indices. The real devaluations of Latin Amer- 
ican currencies during 1980-83 would appear somewhat less dramatic 
if international dollar prices were used in the analysis (a point echoing 417  Economic Adjustment and the Real Exchange Rate 
stylized facts of the early 1930s). On the other hand, the nonimported 
component of  the domestic inflations in  Latin America would loom 
larger for 1980-83. 
Numerous puzzles remain. Even during short periods Haiti and Pan- 
ama tend to follow U.S. price  trends more than international price 
trends. This is particularly striking during 1980-83.  Either their econ- 
omies are not as open as they used to be, or  the international price 
indexes have peculiar  and unbalanced  weights (note that Haiti and 
Panama have very different per capita incomes and, presumably, dif- 
ferent consumption and production baskets, yet their price trends are 
similar). On balance, this evidence leads me  to accept Harberger’s 
recommendation for using the U.S. wholesale prices, even for short 
periods, although I do so with some misgivings and pleas for further 
research on the international dollar price level relevant for different 
types of LDCs. 
Recent experiences in Latin America and elsewhere have reinforced 
the argument that exchange rate policy should differ between LDCs 
and most developed countries. Freely fluctuating exchange rates with 
substantial convertibility, an attractive option for most developed coun- 
tries, remain out of reach for the majority of LDCs, except during short 
transitions or  for the most advanced countries. Credible options for 
LDCs wishing to have a national currency seem limited to traditional 
fixed pegs to one currency or to a basket of major currencies, or  to 
passive crawling pegs, for the larger LDCs. 
Fuzzy but venerable optimum currency area considerations still carry 
weight for numerous very small LDCs, many with long traditions of 
price stability. Freely fluctuating rates among developed countries have 
complicated  the choice of peg for these LDCs and have introduced 
some inevitable flexibility in their effective exchange rates. But some 
peg and some convertibility vis a vis at least one major currency remain 
the cornerstones of the credibility of national cash and coins, as well 
as of confidence in domestic banks. In these LDCs the relevant policy 
change may be either having a pegged nominal rate or having no national 
currency at all. 
But what should keep larger LDCs with a long tradition of monetary 
autonomy, and often of monetary excess, from adopting freely fluc- 
tuating exchange rates with  substantial convertibility? The simplest 
answer is that a majority of these countries are in a near-permanent 
state of policy experimentation, the success of which crucially depends 
on the real effective exchange rate  and on the rate of  devaluation. 
Those experiments typically  include transitions  toward less protec- 
tionist commercial policies, lower rates of inflation, and more efficient 
yet  safe domestic financial systems.  A  truly  flexible exchange rate 
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This combination generates large changes in real effective exchange 
rates even in developed countries; in  LDCs with thin future markets 
and shallow and shaky banking, financial, and political institutions, one 
would  expect  even  greater  exchange  rate  gyrations,  which  would 
threaten  trade  liberalization, inflation control, the  stability and  effi- 
ciency of the domestic financial system, as well  as the reliability of 
signals emanating from the price system. 
Because the real effective exchange rate is such a crucial variable 
for LDCs engaged in policy experiments, I feel uneasy about Harber- 
ger’s pessimistic assessment of attempts to establish systematic em- 
pirical links between that variable and such at least partly exogenous 
variables as the terms of trade and capital movements, whose often 
violent fluctuations are a source of  shocks to LDCs. Policy makers 
groping for a real effective exchange rate compatible with a more open 
and stable economy would gain much from knowing how that variable 
relates at least to the expected terms of trade and to “normal”  capital 
movements. 
The inability of preannounced  nominal “active”  crawling pegs to 
credibly deliver on a real effective exchange rate compatible with trade 
liberalization, stable capital flows, and the nimble adjustment of do- 
mestic relative prices to outside shocks has doomed “tablita” exper- 
iments. One can imagine a world in which the tablita would simulta- 
neously  reduce  inflation,  generate  quickly  the  real  exchange  rate 
compatible  with trade and financial liberalization, and coexist  with 
orderly capital flows. Copper, corn, and coffee exporters, with long 
histories of  domestic inflation and abrupt policy changes, are most 
unlikely ever to live in that world. Betting on the tablita is a very risky 
business for them. 
Bailouts  during the  1982-85  period  have  shown  that  one cannot 
expect the threat of losses and bankruptcies to be a major disciplining 
element keeping private capital inflows into LDCs near optimum levels. 
After this experience lenders will expect LDC governments explicitly 
to guarantee and therefore to control private as well as public borrowing 
abroad.  In  this  sense, international lenders are imposing the use of 
exchange controls even on those LDCs disliking them; once inflows 
are regulated it appears inevitable to do so with capital outflows also. 
If exchange rates are roughly “correct”  and if domestic inflations are 
below levels that make  “currency substitution”  too tempting, those 
controls may be accompanied by relatively few distortions and could 
provide some insurance against shocks and unwarranted panics. The 
danger, of course, is that they will be used as substitutes to desirable 
adjustments in the real exchange rate or to buttress extravagant levels 
in the inflation tax on domestic currency. One returns to the old truism 
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are out of control, while most exchange systems will do reasonably 
fine if fiscal and monetary policies are prudent  and are expected to 
remain so. 
Finally, it may be noted that multiple exchange rates have experi- 
enced a revival during 1982-85  in Latin America-not  so much as a 
mechanism to tax exporters or to prevent further terms-of-trade de- 
terioration, as during the 1930s, but as devices to bail out externally 
indebted private firms and public enterprises. Cheap dollars have been 
delivered and promised to those firms to keep them from bankruptcy 
and to keep their foreign creditors from blacklisting all domestic bor- 
rowers. The fiscal cost of these subsidies may be quite large. 
Comment  Mohsin S. Khan 
Harberger’s paper is certainly a wide-ranging and comprehensive piece. 
It would really not be too much of  an exaggeration to say that it gives 
us just about “everything we ever wanted to know about real exchange 
rates,” and perhaps more! In analyzing the various questions regarding 
real exchange rates, Harberger brings in his unique blend of economic 
intuition, technical skills, and a remarkable ability to synthesize and 
simplify some fairly complex arguments. 
The first part of  the paper comprising sections  11.2 and  11.3 goes 
through a very standard partial-equilibrium treatment of  the determi- 
nation of nominal and real exchange rates, respectively, and shows the 
effects on these of a variety of shocks. There is very little to take issue 
with in the almost textbook approach, as Harberger himself recognizes, 
adopted here; and its usefulness lies in the fact that it is all put together 
in one convenient place. What surprised me, and this will probably 
strike other readers as well, is that there is no mention whatsoever of 
any of  the current work or thinking on the subject of  exchange rates. 
Although we may not have learned very much in this area, the volu- 
minous literature on the subject is certainly worth a few words. The 
one other reservation I have about the specific analysis in those two 
sections is that it leads Harberger to argue for a particular definition 
of the real exchange rate, and I believe such an inference cannot nec- 
essarily be made. I will pick up this point later in this comment. 
The paper, despite its breathtaking scope, does exhibit some addi- 
tional weaknesses. In certain instances Harberger skirts some difficult 
issues and ignores existing work on the subject, while in others he is 
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too cavalier in pressing  his point.  A  major omission I found is the 
absence of any discussion of effective exchange rates, whether nominal 
or real. The paper focuses exclusively on bilateral exchange rates, and 
it would have been preferable to round out the picture by some analysis 
of effective exchange rates. There are several important issues that 
need to be addressed here, such as the choice of the base period, the 
weights to be used, and the choice of price indices. Without any dis- 
cussion of effective exchange rates, which are after all the relevant 
indicators of a country’s international competitiveness, the paper does 
tend to lose some of its relevance for policy. 
There are essentially three specific areas where I found myself par- 
ticularly uncomfortable with Harberger’s analysis: the definition, mea- 
surement, and, determination of the real exchange rate. I will deal with 
these in turn. 
Definition of  the Real Exchange Rate 
Let me state at the outset that I agree with Harberger that there is 
a great deal of  confusion  in the literature regarding the appropriate 
definition of the real exchange rate.  I would not, however, go along 
with him in his claim that since a particular definition (Elp,) is able to 
replicate the results of his model, it is therefore the correct one. Re- 
jecting  a definition that  has become  quite popular  in  recent  years, 
namely, the ratio of the price of tradables to nontradables (Pt/pn),  be- 
cause it yields ambiguous answers is, I believe, too hasty. The world 
may well be more complicated than Harberger’s model would lead us 
to believe, and thus the fact that the response of the real exchange rate 
to a certain type of shock is not clear cut is hardly surprising. Indeed, 
if one considers a model with tradable (importable and exportable) and 
nontradable goods, one can still obtain the same, or at least similar, 
answers, provided certain conditions, such as gross substitutability in 
demand, are met. For example, the imposition of a uniform tariff on 
imports in a Dornbusch-type model would lead to an appreciation of 
the real exchange rate (a fall in the domestic currency price of foreign 
money).[ There is no ambiguity here, although in the case of  other 
types of shocks there may well be. 
At any rate, this alteration in the model turns out not to matter much 
in the final analysis because of the way the real exchange rate that Har- 
berger prefers is actually defined,  p*E/pd.  To use Harberger’s own words, 
the foreign price index, p”,  is an index of the “dollar prices of tradable 
goods somewhere on the high seas.” If the domestic price index, pd,  is 
highly correlated with the price index of nontradable goods in the home 
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most economies, then p*Elpd  p,lp,. In essence, one has gone through 
a fairly convoluted exercise to get back to square one. 
The Measurement of the Real Exchange Rate 
Following Harberger’s framework I will also divide my comments 
into the following: first, the appropriate domestic price deflator; and 
second, the world price deflator. 
The Domestic Price Deflator 
There is really no dispute on the relative merits of using the consumer 
price index (CPI) or the whole price index (WPI) to construct the real 
exchange rate. The CPI is often the only reliable price index available 
in developing countries, and the fact that it is a better measure than 
the WPI is certainly fortunate. To  the reasons given in the paper on 
why the CPI is preferable, I would add that it is also a better indicator 
of overall labor costs in the economy. But the CPI is also not free of 
problems, particularly  in  developing countries.  For example, it is a 
meaningful proxy only for short-run changes in relative costs; it does 
not directly reflect profitability of the primary producing sectors; and 
its coverage tends to be concentrated in the urban areas of the country. 
When using the CPI, one therefore has to weigh these negative features 
against the advantages when using the CPI. 
The paper also appears to argue that the GDP deflator is in  some 
sense an ideal index and that it would be the one to use were it not 
for the fact that it appears with a significant lag, and then only on an 
annual basis. It should be noted, however, that the GDP deflator also 
has problems. First of all, it is truly relevant mainly for long-run de- 
velopments in Profitability. Second, the way in which the GDP deflator 
is computed (as the ratio of current to constant-price value added) can 
cause major errors, since the imputation of  value added at constant 
prices for certain types of goods and services may not be sufficiently 
reliable for most developing countries. Finally, the GDP deflator may 
exclude certain types of costs, such as the costs of nonmanufacturing 
intermediate inputs in the manufacturing sector. 
All these points are, of course, well known, but they should be kept 
in  mind when picking a domestic price index to deflate to a nominal 
exchange rate. 
The Foreign Price Deflator 
Fewer problems are posed by the choice of the foreign price deflator 
that one should use in defining the real exchange rate. I am less sanguine 
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culation of real exchange rates because most developing countries do 
not have such high rates of inflation that one can ignore foreign price 
changes. I suppose Harberger has in mind such countries as Argentina, 
Bolivia, and Brazil, rather than developing countries in general. But I 
believe one will almost always have to bring foreign prices into the 
picture. 
I have three basic points to make regarding the foreign price deflator. 
First, I think  that one ought  to use  a country-specific  index rather 
than a general international price index, as suggested by Harberger. 
Consider his  own  example of  a country  that  is  an  oil importer.  A 
change in the price of petroleum products may have a small effect on 
the “world”  price level, but as we  saw in  the  1970s, it can have a 
dramatic  effect  on an  individual country’s import price  level.  It  is 
really  not  too difficult  to  calculate a weighted  average  of  partner- 
country wholesale price indexes for individual developing countries, 
so why not do so? 
Second, suppose one has followed Harberger and decided to work 
with a single index. Would it then matter a great deal whether one 
used the U.S. wholesale price index or some type of weighted average 
of  the wholesale price indexes of  countries that make up, say, the 
SDR basket? In fact, Harberger calls for the construction and pub- 
lication  of  such  an  index using  SDR  weights.  I  am not  sure how 
much mileage one would get from this, as these two price series are 
likely to be  closely  related, if  only because  the  U.S.  series would 
have a relatively large weight in any basket.  To  illustrate this point 
I ran a regression relating a weighted average of  the consumer price 
indexes of  all the industrialized countries (Pw)  to the U.S.  consumer 
price  index  (Pus).* Using  quarterly  data for the period  1976-84,  I 
found:3 
Io~Pw,  =  -0.096  + 0.993 logPus, 
(1.41)  (88.52) 
(R2 = 0.996; Durbin-Watson = 2.49). 
Though one would not want to take this regression too seriously, it 
does show the tight fit between the two series. I suspect the result for 
wholesale prices would be similar, and so I am not convinced that much 
would be gained by going the weighted-average route. 
Finally, Harberger ignores  the work that  has been  done on price 
indexes for tradable and nontradable goods.  Such series have been 
constructed  by  Clements (1980) for the U.S. and by  Goldstein  and 
Officer (1979) for a number of industrialized countries. The method- 
ology outlined in their papers is fairly straightforward and can be easily 
used to construct a series for the price of tradables, if indeed that is 
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The Determinants of  the Real Exchange Rate 
Harberger also tends to be much too pessimistic about the possibil- 
ities of modeling the real exchange rate for developing countries. Here 
I think he is influenced by studies on Latin America, and specifically 
those dealing with countries in the Southern Cone. Aghevli (1981), for 
example, has shown that one can specify and estimate such a model 
for a number of Asian countries. In general, there is ample evidence 
that relating the real exchange rate to variables such as money growth, 
inflation, and fiscal deficits produces fairly good fits in time-series anal- 
ysis. Of course, shocks, whether real or nominal, also play an important 
role; one therefore should not assume that these models will necessarily 
be appropriate for prediction purposes. Rather than throwing up one’s 
hands in despair, I would argue for more research on this topic. Perhaps 
no fundamental law will emerge, but identifying any empirical regu- 
larities in the behavior of  real exchange rates would still represent an 
important step forward. 
Notes 
1.  See Dornbusch (1974). 
2.  The data on  these indexes are reported regularly in International Financial Statistics 
(Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund). The index for the industrialized coun- 
tries is calculated using GDP weights. 
3. The values in parentheses are t-ratios. The equation  was corrected for second- 
order autocorrelation  in the errors. 
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